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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether or not perceptions of 
organizational politics mediate the relationships between accountants' personality and 
interpersonal traits and their perceptions of a superior’s leadership ability and performance.  An 
accountant who has a higher degree of confidence in his or her superior’s abilities is more likely 
to be committed to a given project, resulting in a better project outcome.  This benefits the client 
and ultimately society as a whole.  This study contributes to the accounting and psychology 
literatures because extant research views perceptions of leadership ability and performance from 
the perspective of the individual agent, with little or no recognition that social action and 
interaction shape and mold both the individual agent's actions and perceptions of those actions. 
Perceived leadership and perceived performance are important in accounting for several 
reasons.  First, individuals act in part in relation and response to the expectations of others.  
Thus, the perception of effective leadership and performance is gained by meeting the 
expectations of others.  Secondly, accountants with reputations for effectiveness have been found 
to be more successful in their careers.  Finally, the reputation for effectiveness in performance 
and leadership ability has been shown to increase those abilities. 
This study draws on the adaptive self-regulation framework as well as other theoretical 
models of perceived performance.  The study results indicate that certain manageable 
personality, interpersonal, and contextual variables affect how accountants view the level of 
organizational politics within the workplace.  In turn, the accountant’s view of the organizations’ 
politics is shown to very strongly affect how the accountant perceives his or her superiors’ 
performance and leadership ability. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Perceived performance and perceived leadership are widely studied constructs in the 
organizational and psychology literatures (Daniel, 1992; Atwater et al., 1995).  These perceptual 
variables are important in accounting for several reasons.  First, individuals act in part in relation 
and in response to, the expectations of others.  Thus, perceptions of effective leadership and 
performance are gained by meeting the expectations of others (Kotter, 1985; 44).  Secondly, 
individuals with reputations for effectiveness have been found to be more successful in their 
careers (Kilduff & Day, 1994; 1048).  Finally, the reputation for better leadership ability has 
been shown to correspond to increased performance assessments (Sosik et al., 2002). 
Studies show that accountants also have to worry about how their performance is 
perceived by others (Pratt & Jiambalvo, 1981; 1982; Jiambalvo & Pratt, 1982; Kelley & 
Margheim, 1990; Otley & Pierce, 1995).  This study examines subordinate accountants’ 
perceptions of their superiors’ performance and leadership ability.  The subordinate accountant’s 
perception of the superior’s leadership ability is important in part because accountant leadership 
usually involves the exercise of judgment; hence, people can disagree about whether the 
accountant’s judgments are correct.  For example, an accountant may direct a subordinate 
accountant to perform a particular task that the subordinate accountant does not perceive as 
necessary.  If the subordinate accountant views the superior as someone who performs well, he 
or she is less likely to question the superior accountant’s directive and is more likely to exhibit 
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desirable organizational citizenship behaviors 1 (Hope, 2003; Miles & Mangold, 2002).  On the 
other hand, if the superior accountant’s performance is perceived poorly, subordinate 
accountants will likely not fully vest in the directives of that superior (Hope, 2003).  In this case, 
not only are desirable organizational citizenship behaviors unlikely but also employee 
dissatisfaction has been shown to increase (Hope, 2003; Miles & Mangold, 2002).  An example 
of the importance of the subordinate’s view of his or her superiors’ leadership relates to how the 
subordinate accountant views the superior’s fairness and support.  Employees consider their 
superior as their key representative in the organizational justice processes of the organization 
(Vigoda, 2000; 192).  Hence, the subordinate accountant’s sense of fairness and, ultimately, 
satisfaction depends greatly on his or her perception of the superior accountant’s judgments and 
behaviors.  Social exchange theories generally predict that a subordinate’s perception of a fair 
and just organization should result in increased employee performance (Moorman et al., 1998; 
Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Farh et al., 1990).  This lends greater weight to the importance of a 
subordinate’s perceptions of his or her superior’s leadership and performance.  These perceptions 
of the superior’s performance will vary depending upon the situation.  Further, perceptions of the 
superior accountant’s performance will be affected by a variety of technical, personal, social, and 
other factors. 
 There are a number of theories about perceived leadership and performance in the 
organizational and psychology literatures that theorize consequences to perceptions of leadership 
and performance.  Two of these theories were chosen to guide this investigation:  the theory of 
adaptive self-regulation (Tsui & Ashford, 1994) and the theory of the perception of 
                                                 
1 Organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) consist of exceeding job requirement.  OCB have been accepted in the 
management literature as necessary for the effective functioning of organizations (Morrison, 1994; 1543). 
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organizational politics as conceived of by Kacmar et al. (1999).  The adaptive self-regulation 
theory was chosen because it purports to describe the ways by which individuals manage others’ 
perceptions and expectations.  Two of the managed perceptions that the adaptive self-regulation 
model has been used to address are perceived leadership and perceived performance (Sosik et al., 
2002).  Core components of the adaptive self-regulation theory relate to processes employed by 
the individual to manage expectations (See Figure 1).  However, of more relevance to the present 
study is that research in the adaptive self-regulation stream has identified a number of personal, 
interpersonal, job and organizational variables that are theorized to have an impact on 
perceptions of leadership and performance.  Adaptive self-regulation theorizes the effects of 
these variables, but is not clear as to the nature of these effects.  Specifically, adaptive self-
regulation is not clear as to whether the variables affect perceptions directly or indirectly by 
mediation through yet other variables.  Hence, one contribution of the present study is to more 
carefully theorize and test these effects. 
In the Kacmar et al. (1999) study, perceived leadership was also modeled.2  In that study, 
they identified an additional determinant of perceived performance and perceived leadership not 
found in the adaptive self-regulation model.3  That variable is the individual’s perception of 
organizational politics, and it was not included in the original adaptive self-regulation model.  
Hence, an additional contribution of the present study is to combine elements of the two models.  
An individual’s perception of organizational politics is important because a work environment, 
                                                 
2 Perceived leadership was termed perceived supervisor effectiveness but the constructs were the same (Kacmar et 
al., 1999; 390). 
3 The Kacmar et al. (1999) model is predicated on the 1989 Perceptions of Organizational Politics model of Ferris et 
al.  However, Ferris et al. (1989) did not study perceptions of leadership and performance as consequences to other 
variables. 
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which is viewed as being political in nature can negatively influence the behavior and attitudes 
of employees (Huang et al., 2003; 519). 
The purpose of this study is to test a model of perceived leadership and performance that 
combines elements of the adaptive self-regulation model and the Kacmar et al. theorizing on the 
perceptions of organizational politics.  The outcome variables are a superior’s perceived 
leadership and perceived performance.  The model contains classes of predictor variables:  
personal, interpersonal, job and organizational.  By combining the two theories, this study tests 
whether the variables of interest from the adaptive self-regulation model are mediated by the 
subordinate’s perception of the organization’s politics (See Figure 2). 
The personal variable of interest in this study is the subordinate’s self-monitoring ability.  
A difference in the subordinate’s perception of the organization’s political climate is predicted 
based in part on his or her self-monitoring level.  There are three interpersonal variables of 
interest – trust, conflict orientation, and power.  When the subordinate feels empowered and has 
trust in his or her superior, the subordinate’s perception of organizational politics is expected to 
be lower than when the subordinate feels less empowered and less trusting.  Predictions differ for 
the effect on the perception of organizational politics depending on the interpersonal conflict 
orientation variable.  Generally, subordinates with more productive (“good”) conflict orientations 
should perceive the organizational politics level to be lower.4  The job and organizational 
variables of interest in the current study are the hierarchy of the organization and the 
subordinate’s perception of the superior’s desire to obtain “complete” feedback from 
subordinates.  The more hierarchical the subordinate perceives the organization to be, the higher 
                                                 
4 See the theoretical and hypotheses development section for elaboration of the conflict orientations of collaboration, 
compromise, and accommodation. 
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(more negative) should be his or her perception of the organization’s political level.  If the 
subordinate perceives feedback seeking by his or her superior to be sufficient, and not strictly 
positive feedback seeking, the perception of the organization’s politics should be lower than is 
the case when feedback seeking is either insufficient or strictly positive in nature.  As previously 
mentioned the organizational process variable of interest in the current study is the subordinate’s 
perception of organizational politics.  If the subordinate perceives the level of politics to be 
relatively higher, the prediction is that this will be negatively associated with his or her 
assessment of the superior’s leadership and performance, and vice-versa. 
Data for the above-mentioned variables will be collected using a questionnaire.  
Subordinate accountants will provide measures of their own traits, as well as perceptions of their 
supervisor.  All measures used have been validated in prior research.  The primary method of 
analysis will be structural equation modeling (SEM). 
This paper will make a number of contributions to the accounting, psychology, and 
organizational literature.  As mentioned above, it will formally combine elements of two models 
and test that combination.  It will more carefully investigate the role of certain variables, in terms 
of the nature of their relation to a superior’s perceived leadership and performance.  It will 
provide insight to accounting professionals as to the way certain interrelational and 
organizational factors can be managed to improve leadership perceptions and hence overall 
organizational performance.  Finally, it provides a brief introduction of the adaptive self-
regulation model to the accounting literature. 
Several aspects of the design of this study may limit the ability to generalize its results.  It 
is possible that the working environments of some accountants are so unique that any study other 
than a field study will not capture the relationships and therefore the results may not apply.  
  5
Although steps will be taken to assure anonymity, subordinate accountants may be too 
uncomfortable with questions relating to their superior’s performance to answer honestly.  
Finally, it is possible that certain variables were excluded from the model that better explain 
accountants’ perceptions of superior’s leadership and performance. 
The following chapter describes the theoretical development and conceptual model.  In it, 
selected literature is reviewed and the hypotheses are derived.  The third chapter contains the 
research design and methodology that will be used to test the hypotheses.  This section contains a 
discussion of the measurement scales along with their derivations.  The fourth chapter includes 
the data analysis and a discussion of structural equation modeling, the confirmatory factor 
analysis, hypothesis testing, and additional analyses.  The final chapter concludes with the 
analysis of the findings, the limitations of this study, as well as opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT & CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
Perceived Leadership & Performance 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, accounting studies show that accountants should worry 
about how their leadership and performance is perceived by others (Pratt & Jiambalvo, 1981; 
1982; Jiambalvo & Pratt, 1982; Kelley & Margheim, 1990; Otley & Pierce, 1995).5  These 
studies of perceived leadership and performance within accounting are further discussed below. 
In both Pratt & Jiambalvo (1981, 1982) studies, leadership within auditing was 
investigated.  The 1981 field study findings identify leader behaviors in auditing which may 
influence, either directly or indirectly through some intermediary factors, audit team 
performance.  The theoretical base for this study was the then contemporary leadership model 
which focused on leader “initiating structure” and “consideration” as the determinates of 
effectiveness.  Consideration reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to have job 
relationships characterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates ideas, and consideration of 
their feelings.  Initiating structure reflects the extent to which an individual is likely to define and 
structure his (or her) own role and those of his (or her) subordinates toward goal attainment 
(Howell, 1976; 85). 
Pratt & Jiambalvo (1981, 1982) reported evidence that audit team performance was 
positively related to the supervisors’ level of consideration, and certain of the structuring 
                                                 
5 A number of early studies looked at leadership issues in the context of accounting control systems but these studies 
were not particularly relevant to the superior/subordinate relationships which are the focus of the current study 
(DeCoster & Fertakis, 1968; Hopwood, 1974; Ansari, 1968). 
  7
leadership behaviors also varied positively with audit team performance.  A positive relationship 
was found between considerate leadership behaviors and interpersonal relationships, satisfaction, 
and motivation.  This study suggests that addressing the behavioral interactions among audit 
team members is necessary to maximize audit effectiveness.  The researchers conclude that while 
many of the relationships are complex, overall they find that certain leader behaviors affect audit 
team performance directly, and others (such as staff satisfaction, motivation, performance, and 
audit team interpersonal relations) affect audit team performance indirectly.  The 1982 paper 
provided similar results.  Pratt & Jiambalvo (1982) found that leader behavior in auditing is 
related to certain antecedent variables and that the behavior exhibited by the accounting superior 
relates to subordinate performance, motivation, and job satisfaction.  The researchers concluded 
that a more complex model might be required to explain leadership behavior adequately, a model 
that includes additional variables and recognizes interactions among the variables 
The accountant superior-subordinate relationship and perceptions of the superior’s 
leadership on the subordinate’s satisfaction and motivation was also examined in a study by 
Jiambalvo and Pratt (1982).  In this study, path goal theory was the framework utilized.  
Leadership “consideration” and “initiating structure” were examined independently.  They found 
that subordinates reported greater satisfaction with the superior, that tasks were accomplished 
more quickly, and they were more involved in the task when superiors engaged in more 
considerate leader behaviors.  The effect of structuring leadership behavior on the subordinate’s 
satisfaction level was weak.  However, a significant interaction between consideration and 
structuring leadership behaviors was found, leading them to conclude that unless structuring 
behavior is accompanied by consideration behavior, the subordinate’s level of satisfaction will 
be low.  Structuring leadership behaviors also were found to have a positive effect on the time 
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required for relatively complex tasks, but a negative effect during simple tasks.  In addition, it 
was found that considerate leadership behaviors had a greater impact when subordinates were 
performing relatively simple tasks. 
Kelly and Margheim (1990) examined the effect of  time budget pressure on 
dysfunctional auditor behavior.  As part of their study, they examined the effect of senior 
auditors’ leadership characteristics on audit quality and subordinate accountants’ dysfunctional 
audit behavior, specifically underreporting of time.  They found that when the subordinate’s 
perception of the superior’s time budget was “very tight, practically unattainable” or when the 
senior auditor had very strong Type A personality traits, underreporting of time occurred.  In 
addition to perceptions of “very tight, practically unattainable” time budgets or time budgets that 
were only “attainable with considerable effort” when a senior auditor was perceived as providing 
less structured leadership, audit quality reduction acts were more common.  As in the last study, 
they conclude that high levels of both consideration and structure are needed to produce the best 
outcome in terms of limiting dysfunctional subordinate behaviors. 
Otley and Pierce (1995) is an extension of the four previously mentioned studies.  They 
examine the effect of the audit manager’s leadership style in a non-US setting on the behavior of 
in-charge seniors while also testing the moderator variable “perceived environmental 
uncertainty” (PEU).  By dividing the participants into four leadership groups based on their 
levels of consideration and structuring, behavior patterns emerged in relation to dysfunctional 
behaviors.  The greatest frequency of dysfunctional behavior by subordinates occurred when the 
superior had a high structure/low consideration orientation.  The second highest frequency 
occurred in the low structure/low consideration group.  The third greatest frequency was with the 
high structure/high consideration group.  The lowest reported frequency of dysfunctional 
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behaviors was reported by the low structure/high consideration group.  However, because 
previous research has shown that no single style of leadership is ideal in all circumstances, the 
researchers tested the PEU variable.  They found various differences in desired levels of 
structure and consideration depending on the level of PEU. 
 Although perceived leadership ability and performance have been studied within the 
accounting domain, they have not been investigated in the manner of this dissertation study.  The 
above studies of perceived leadership and performance examine the effect of different leader 
styles and characteristics on other outcomes such as dysfunctional audit behaviors.  The current 
study differs in that the antecedents of the superior’s leadership ability and performance are the 
variables of interest.  Specifically, the antecedents of interest are personal subordinate 
characteristics and manageable interpersonal characteristics.  The current study also differs from 
prior research in that the demographics of the sample were far different then the previous studies.  
In general, previous study participants were younger, had less experience, and were less diverse 
in terms of working environment and level of employment than those who participated in this 
study. 
Again, the outcomes investigated in this study are the subordinate accountant’s 
perception of the leadership and performance of his or her superior.  These perceptions are 
particularly important because individuals act in part, in relation to, and in response to, the 
expectations of others.  Thus, an individual can increase others’ perceptions of his or her 
performance and leadership by meeting the expectations of his or her subordinates (Kotter, 1985; 
44).  A benefit to high levels of perceived leadership and performance is career success (Kilduff 
& Day, 1994; 1048).  In addition, the subordinate accountant’s perception of the superior’s 
leadership and performance is important because leaders are known to exert a strong influence 
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on subordinates’ beliefs about their work environment (Kacmar et al., 1999; 390).  The 
reputation for being an effective leader also has been found to correspond to increased 
performance evaluations (Sosik et al., 2002).  Finally, studies in accounting show that improved 
perceptions of their superior leads to greater satisfaction, commitment, and better performance 
on the part of the subordinate accountants (Pratt & Jiambalvo, 1981; 1982; Jiambalvo & Pratt, 
1982; Kelley & Margheim, 1990; Otley & Pierce, 1995).  This in turn leads to better overall 
project performance and the ultimate betterment of society.  In order to conceptualize which 
factors affect the accountant’s perceptions of his or her superior’s leadership and performance, 
elements of the adaptive self-regulation model and the perception of organizational politics 
construct will be examined. 
 
 
Adaptive Self-Regulation and Perceived Leadership & Performance 
 
The adaptive self-regulation model has been used to theorize the ways by which an 
individual manages others’ perceptions of his or her leadership and performance (Tsui & 
Ashford, 1994).  Thus, it is one process employed by a leader to manage perceptions of his or her 
effectiveness.  In today’s dynamic business world, organizational control systems cannot, nor 
should they, fully specify appropriate leader behavior.  Thus, adaptive self-regulation has the 
potential to benefit both individuals and organizations. 
For a leader to be perceived as effective, he or she must bring about a fit between his or 
her own cognitive system of behavioral controls and the control systems of the organization.  
The individual’s continuing attempt to conform to organizational controls or expectations is 
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referred to as the process of personal self-regulation (See Figure 1).  This conforming process 
includes three distinct sub-processes or elements that are used to bring about the perceived fit: 
standard setting, discrepancy detection and discrepancy reduction.  The initial elements of the 
personal self-regulation process are the standards or values set by others.  For an accountant, 
these standards might include formal control systems such as the Code of Conduct, GAAP, and 
firm policies; the demands of multiple constituents such as superiors, peers, clients, subordinates 
and the public; as well as individual needs and desires.  The individual next monitors and 
compares his or her own behavior to these standards.  If the individual detects a difference 
between the two, he or she attempts to make behavioral adjustments to reduce the discrepancy, in 
order to bring about a better fit between the standards and the behavior.  Therefore, individuals 
who monitor and adapt or control their own behavior should be perceived as better leaders and 
performers.  As well, subordinates who are able to close the distance between their own 
standards and those of their superiors are better at self-regulating.  For the interested reader, a 
more detailed overview of the core components of adaptive self-regulation is available in 
Appendix A. 
Of particular relevance to this study are the various classes of variables that the model of 
adaptive self-regulation posits will influence perceptions of leadership and performance.  These 
classes are personal, interpersonal, job, and organizational variables.  The focus of the remainder 
of this study is on how selected variables from these classes relate to the subordinate 
accountant’s perception of his or her superior’s leadership and performance. 
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Personal Influence 
 
Within the personal class of variables theorized to affect an individual’s perceptions of 
their environments is the variable of self-monitoring.6  In developing their model, Tsui and 
Ashford (1994) identified self-monitoring as an essential individual difference variable in the 
adaptive self-regulation process and hence it is a variable of interest in this study. 
Prior research typically characterizes individuals as either high or low self-monitoring 
individuals.  High self-monitoring individuals seek and use information from others to monitor 
and manage self-presentation and expressive behavior.  Low self-monitoring individuals are not 
as concerned with their self-presentation and hence are less likely to seek and/or use information 
from others to adjust their behavior.  High self-monitoring individuals are sensitive to the cues 
for appropriate behavior and use this feedback to make the adjustments necessary to reduce or 
eliminate any differences they have with others (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). 
The developer of the self-monitoring construct, Snyder (1979) defined it as self-
observation and self-control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness.  Lennox and 
Wolfe (1984) further restricted the concept of self-monitoring to sensitivity to the expressive 
behavior of others and the ability to modify self-presentation.  This relatively narrow definition 
is argued to be more reflective of the aptitude of high self-monitoring individuals (Lennox and 
Wolfe, 1984).  Self-observation and self-control relate to how the individual accountant will 
interact with his or her environment when assessing the performance and leadership of his or her 
superior.  For instance, high self-monitoring subordinate accountants as opposed to low self-
                                                 
6 Self-monitoring is also specifically named as an important personal variable in the Perceptions of Organizational 
Politics framework discussed next. 
  13
monitoring subordinate accountants are theorized to differentially perceive the political climate 
of the organization.  This study will then determine if any differences in perceptions of the 
political climate lead to differences in the subordinate accountants assessment of the superior’s 
leadership and performance. 
 
 
Interpersonal Influences 
 
In the adaptive self-regulation model, three interpersonal variables are theorized to be 
influential – the power relationship, conflict orientation style, and the interpersonal trust 
relationship between the subordinate and the superior (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).  The first 
interpersonal variable, the power relationship, relates to the subordinate accountant’s perception 
of the legitimacy of the individual making the claim to power, in this case the superior, whether 
the superior has the right to sanction the subordinate accountant and whether the subordinate 
accountant places greater weight on legitimacy concerns or on sanctions or weights them 
equally. 
In general, interpersonal power is defined as having the potential to influence or control 
others (French & Raven, 1959), a necessary antecedent to effective leadership.  The manner, 
direct, or indirect, in which the power relationship affects the influenced individual’s 
perceptions, remains under theorized; accordingly, both direct and indirect effects are posited.  
According to the adaptive self-regulation model, the extent of influence one individual has over 
another also depends on the power relationship between the two individuals.  Again, the manner 
or path of the influence is unclear.  Under either theory, the superior’s influence on the 
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subordinate’s perceptions is predicted to be differentially affected by the subordinate’s 
perception of the power relationship. 
The French and Raven (1959) topology of interpersonal power specifically delineates 
different sources of social power as bases by which people exert the construct of interest, social 
influence.  The five sources of power presented in the French and Raven (1959) model are the 
power to reward, the power to coerce, the power of expertise, the power of legitimacy, and 
referent power.  Ideally, all sources exist within a given superior/subordinate relationship 
although the relative influence of each of the sources of power differs in each situation. 
Reward power occurs when subordinates believe that the superior can provide desired 
rewards.  Coercive power exists when the subordinate believes that the superior has the power to 
punish.  It is important to note that the use of either of these bases of power is theorized to induce 
only temporary and superficial changes in the subordinate.  Only public compliance is obtained 
and not a change in attitude, belief, or values.  As such, surveillance is required for continued 
compliance (Bruins, 1999).  Superiors typically are the ones who have both reward and coercive 
power.  However, if the superior is viewed as only having reward and coercive power, the 
subordinate typically views the organizational climate negatively or as highly political as well as 
viewing the superior’s leadership and performance poorly. 
If the perception is that a superior possesses expertise or knowledge in his or her specific 
field, he or she can influence through the use of expert power.  A superior who is perceived to 
possess expertise is predicted to be viewed as a good performer, but this alone is not enough to 
affect a subordinate’s perceptions of the superior’s leadership ability.  A superior’s power is 
legitimate to the extent that subordinates believe the superior has the right to exert power over 
others.  A frequent source of legitimate power is the position of the superior relative to the 
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subordinate either within the formal hierarchy of the firm or the relative assigned positions on a 
work team.  Legitimate power is a desired base of power in a superior/subordinate relationship 
because it is accepted by the subordinate, and thus does not require surveillance for continued 
compliance.  If the subordinate perceives the superior’s power as legitimate, he or she is likely to 
should perceive a lower level of organizational politics and higher levels of leadership ability in 
the superior.  Lastly, referent power refers to the subordinate’s identification with the superior.  
This of all the power bases should most positively affect the subordinate’s perceptions of the 
organization’s politics as well as the superior’s leadership ability and performance.  A typical 
source of referent power is goodwill on the part of the subordinate based upon previous 
experience working with the superior. 
The French and Raven (1959) model acknowledges that power can be based on the need 
or desire to maintain relationships and not just on the possession of external status or resources.  
To this end, adaptive self-regulation theory predicts different relationship strategies for a 
subordinate accountant and his or her superior.  For instance, if the accountant is acting in the 
position of a subordinate, he or she is more likely to use a compliance strategy than if the 
accountant is in the position of a superior.  Similarly, an “act and explain” strategy7 is a more 
likely action for a superior dealing with a subordinate than vice versa.  The power relationship 
might be based on the constituent’s centrality or criticality to the issue or project, their referent 
power, and/or their expert power.  Among other things, power relationships influence 
information seeking on expectations and feedback regarding performance (Tsui & Ashford, 
                                                 
7 In an “act and explain” strategy, the individual’s behavior does not change.  He or she just explains the behavior to 
interested others in an attempt to reduce any discrepancy between other’s standards and his or her behavior. 
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1994).  Subordinates are more motivated to seek feedback from superiors than the reverse (Tsui 
& Ashford, 1994; 108). 
Another interpersonal variable, conflict orientation, refers to the methods an individual 
typically relies on when faced with a conflict situation.  Since conflicts between individuals are a 
normal and necessary facet of working relationships, the way in which an individual handles 
these conflicts becomes important.  Research within the management discipline traditionally 
refers to Thomas’s (1976) five orientations or styles toward handling conflict: competition, 
collaboration, compromising, avoidance, and accommodation (Tsui & Ashford, 1994; 108).  
Thomas (1988; 433) classifies these conflict-handling orientations or styles into two basic 
dimensions of strategic intent-cooperativeness (attempting to satisfy the other party’s concerns) 
and assertiveness (attempting to satisfy one’s own concerns).  An individual whose orientation 
toward handling conflict is described as competitive is one who is highly assertive but not very 
cooperative – his or her primary goal is to win.  Collaborative individuals are both highly 
assertive and highly cooperative, they look for a win-win situation.  Those moderately assertive 
and cooperative have a compromising orientation and seek a middle ground.  An individual who 
is neither assertive nor cooperative has an avoidance orientation and generally seeks delay.  
Finally, low assertiveness and a high level of cooperation leads to an accommodating orientation 
and yielding becomes the goal. 
It is theorized, that although individuals can move from one conflict orientation to 
another, through either practice or temperament most rely heavily on one particular orientation 
(Thomas, 1976).  An accountant with an accommodative orientation should tend to use 
compliance strategies to manage differences with others, while one with a competitive 
orientation should tend to ignore the differences and push his or her own position.  An 
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accountant with a collaborative or compromising orientation may attempt to influence 
expectations or get constituents to alter their perceptions of the behavior in question.  Those with 
an avoidance orientation may either do nothing or retreat with a strategy aimed at maintaining 
his or her self-esteem (Tsui & Ashford, 1994). 
Baron (1989) found that high self-monitoring individuals are more likely to employ either 
collaborating or compromising conflict orientations than are low self-monitoring individuals.  
However, given their adaptive nature, high self-monitoring individuals should be more able to 
alter their conflict orientation style to manage the situation when interacting with others in the 
workplace.  Hence, the conflict orientation of a high self-monitoring individual may be more 
situational and therefore less predictable.  In any event, an accountant’s conflict handling plays a 
role in both how they view the organization’s political climate and how others view them within 
the organization.  In turn, perceptions of leadership and performance should be affected. 
The final interpersonal variable discussed in the model of adaptive self-regulation is 
interpersonal trust.  Trust influences both the extent and the quality of the feedback between two 
individuals.  O’Reilly and Anderson (1980) reported that various aspects of feedback are 
differentially related to perceived performance and satisfaction under conditions of high and low 
trust.  All else being equal, accountants should be more likely to seek direct feedback from those 
they trust more than from those they trust less.  In addition, feedback received is expected to be 
more honest from individuals who are trusted (Tsui & Ashford, 1994; 109).  Therefore, it is 
theorized, that information that is more accurate should be derived through a high interpersonal 
trust relationship (Tsui & Ashford, 1994).  Sgro et al. (1980) supports this theory in that high 
interpersonal trust relationships positively affect a subordinate’s perception of a superior’s 
leadership ability. 
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Job & Organization Contextual Influences 
 
The two job and organizational contextual variables of interest in this study are feedback 
seeking by one’s superior and the hierarchal structure of the organization.  The type of feedback 
sought by the superior differentially affects his or her behavior and subordinates perceptions of 
those behaviors (Ashford & Tsui, 1991).  Superiors seeking feedback may not do so in a rational 
manner, they may seek one type of feedback (positive or negative) at the exclusion of the other.  
This behavior occurs even if the feedback-seeking pattern hurts subordinates’ perceptions of the 
superiors’ performance or of the organization as a whole.  For example, Miller (1976) found that 
some individuals were discouraged from seeking negative feedback because it threatened their 
ego.  Others believe that seeking negative feedback makes weaknesses more salient (Ashford & 
Tsui, 1991).  These findings show irrational behavior on the part of some feedback-seeking 
superiors, since soliciting negative feedback gives an individual a more temperate view and a 
better basis from which to take corrective action and improve perceptions of performance and 
leadership ability (Ashford & Tsui, 1991).  The second contextual influence, hierarchical 
structure is also believed to result in differing perceptions of the leaders’ ability and of the 
organization.  The perceptions of the subordinates are believed to differ because individuals react 
differently at different levels of organizational or leadership control.  Following are the limited 
empirical findings to date that use elements of the adaptive self-regulation model of Tsui and 
Ashford (1994) as a framework for increased understanding. 
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Prior Empirical Research 
 
Tsui et al. (1995) specifically examined leaders’ responses to the expectations of others 
as theorized by the model of adaptive self-regulation of Tsui and Ashford (1994).  They found a 
positive association between specific efforts on the part of the leaders and perceptions of the 
leaders’ effectiveness by subordinates.  The Tsui et al. (1995) study differs from the current 
study in that its focus was on the discrepancy response strategies of the leaders and as such, the 
analysis was conducted on matched pair samples.  The contextual variable of interest in both this 
and the current study is feedback.  The authors suggest in their limitation section that the 
interpersonal variable power should be studied in relationship to feedback. 
Sosik et al. (2002) utilized the adaptive self-regulation model to link self-monitoring with 
perceptions of leadership and performance.  They collected data over a one-year period from 
focal managers, their superiors, and their subordinates.  They found that when subordinates 
viewed their focal manager as utilizing a “good” form of leadership the focal manager’s superior 
increased the performance evaluation of that focal manager. 
Multiple other studies consider the adaptive self-regulation framework as additional 
support for various other theoretical models (Hamlin, 2002; Valcour, 2002; Sosik, 2001; Brett et 
al., 1999).  Even more studies discuss or test variables found within the framework.  The most 
often researched variables of consequence to this study are self-monitoring (Becker et al., 2002) 
and feedback (Ashford & Tsui, 1991). 
These and other studies  have called for further research elaborating on the relationships 
theorized in the model.  A review of the literature suggested “perceptions of organizational 
politics” as a theoretically relevant construct to augment the model.  The perception of 
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organizational politics construct and model were first developed by Ferris et al. (1989).  In 1999, 
Kacmar et al. hypothesized and tested the link from the perception of organizational politics to 
perceptions of a leader’s effectiveness.  A discussion of the construct of organizational politics 
and the relationship to perceived leadership and performance follows. 
 
Perceptions of Organizational Politics and Perceived Leadership & Performance 
 
Many definitions of perceived organizational politics have been proposed within the 
literature, although none has been universally accepted (Christiansen et al., 1997; 711; Huang et 
al., 2003; 520).  The perception of organizational politics is most often defined as the degree to 
which an individual views his or her environment as political, and therefore unjust and unfair 
(Vigoda, 2000; 187). 8  This definition aligns with the theory being tested in this paper and 
therefore was the basis used in this study.  Perceived organizational politics are referent to 
others’ political activities, such as favoritism, suppression of competing entities, and the 
manipulation of organizational policies (Kacmar et al., 1999; 386).  Thus, in this study 
perceptions of higher levels of organizational politics are expected to be associated with 
relatively more negative outcomes including lower perceptions of superior’s performance and 
leadership. 
An early study by Gandz and Murray (1980) found that higher levels of perceived politics 
were associated with more dissatisfied employees (Christiansen et al., 1997; 712).  More 
recently, Parker et al. (1995), found a variety of negative outcomes to highly political climates 
                                                 
8 This approach is rooted in Kurt Lewin’s (1936) argument that individuals respond to their perception of reality, not 
necessarily to actual reality.  Allport (1955) supports the theory and states that from these perceptions attitudes and 
behaviors result. 
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including lower overall employee satisfaction and increased evaluations of management as being 
ineffective.  Perceptions of organizational politics are also often found to cause disharmony and 
conflict within the workplace because political behavior is perceived as unduly self-interested 
behavior (Huang et al., 2003; 520; Vigoda, 2000; 187).   
Kacmar et al., (1999) found that the outcomes from individuals’ perceptions of 
organizational politics are ameliorated by the level of control and /or understanding an individual 
has about organizational processes.  For instance, the degree of understanding an individual has 
about how to influence an organization’s politics can flavor the perceiver’s view of those politics 
as either an opportunity or a threat.  Kacmar et al. (1999) confirmed a previously found direct 
relationship between organization centralization and political activity, in that a highly centralized 
organization’s political activity is high in an attempt to influence decision-makers.  The same 
study found a negative correlation between the perception of organizational politics and 
perceived supervisor effectiveness.  Based upon these findings, the expectation in this study is 
that the more harmonious the relationship is between a superior and a subordinate, the less the 
relationship is negatively impacted by organizational politics.  This in turn is expected to lead to 
the subordinate having a more positive perception of his or her superior's performance and 
leadership. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The rationale for the following hypotheses was developed in detail in the preceeding 
section.  Self-monitoring is considered the key personal variable in the model of adaptive self-
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regulation and is also key to the perceptions of organizational politics model.  The subordinate 
accountant’s self-monitoring level is therefore the personal antecedent of interest in this study.  
Based on the previously discussed theory relating self-monitoring with the ability and/or 
sensitivity to the environment, it is predicted that the subordinate’s perception of the 
organization’s politics will differ depending on his or her self-monitoring level.  High self-
monitoring subordinates should be more capable of detecting the cues from the organizational 
political environment and adapting to those cues, giving them the advantage that results in their 
perceiving the political environment as less threatening.  Accordingly, high self-monitoring 
subordinates should rank the perception of organizational politics lower than their low self-
monitoring counterparts do.  On the other hand, low self-monitoring subordinates are less aware 
of their environment than are high self-monitoring subordinates.  Thus, low self-monitoring 
subordinates may not be aware of a negative political environment within the organization.  If 
this theory holds, low self-monitoring subordinates should rank the perception of organizational 
politics lower than their higher self-monitoring counterparts do.  These conflicting viewpoints 
lead to the following non-directional hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Subordinate accountants with high and low levels of self-monitoring perceive their 
organization’s politics differently. 
 
This study tests a model that combines the perceptions of organizational politics construct 
with predictions from the adaptive self-regulation model (see Figure 2).  The combined model 
predicts that the majority of the interpersonal antecedents of interest should affect an individual’s 
perception of organizational politics inversely .  For example, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
subordinate accountants with high interpersonal levels of trust in their superior should rate the 
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perception of organizational politics at a low level (H2a).  Similarly, subordinates whose 
superiors exhibit sufficient and proper uses of power should rate relatively low levels of 
organizational politics (H3a).  Proper sources of power are defined as relatively high levels of 
referent, reward, legitimate, and expert power along with a relatively low level of coercive 
power.  In addition, those same subordinate accountants (those that rate perceptions of 
organizational politics at a low level) should rate the performance and leadership ability of their 
superior at a high level (H2b, H2c,H3b,H3c). 
Different effects are predicted for subordinate accountants with different conflict 
orientations.  Subordinate accountants with collaborating and avoiding conflict orientations are 
the most motivated to perceive organizational politics as low, while those with competitive 
conflict orientations are most likely to rate the perception of organizational politics as high (H4a, 
H4b, H4c).  No predictions are made for perceptions of organizational politics by subordinate 
accountants with accommodating or compromising conflict orientations.  In addition, high self-
monitoring individuals are more likely to use collaboration or compromise as their major conflict 
orientation (H5a, H5b)9 (Arnold et al., 2001).  This leads to an interaction effect between an 
individual’s self-monitoring and conflict orientation, the only two antecedent constructs in the 
study that measure the subordinate’s traits.  The related hypotheses follow: 
 
H2:  Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors perceive 
organizational politics to be low and the performance and leadership ability of their 
superiors to be high. 
                                                 
9 The other antecedent constructs all of which measure the subordinate’s perception of either relationships or of his 
or her superiors traits are the power relationship, the trust relationship, feedback type, feedback seeking and 
hierarchal structure.  In addition, the outcome variables of perceived performance and perceived leadership ability 
are also measures of the subordinates perception of his or her superior traits. 
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H2a: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive politics to be relatively low. 
H2b: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive the leadership ability of their superiors to be relatively high. 
H2c: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive the performance of their superiors to be relatively high. 
 
 
H3:  Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors perceive 
organizational politics to be low and the performance and leadership ability of their 
superiors to be high. 
H3a: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive organizational politics to be low. 
H3b: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive the leadership ability of their superiors to be relatively high. 
H3c: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive the performance of their superiors to be relatively high. 
 
 
H4:  Subordinate accountants’ conflict orientation affects their perceptions of 
organizational politics.  
H4a: Subordinate accountants with collaborating conflict orientations perceive 
organizational politics to be low. 
H4b: Subordinate accountants with avoiding conflict orientations perceive organizational 
politics to be low.  
H4c: Subordinate accountants with competitive conflict orientations perceive 
organizational politics to be high.  
 
H5:  High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through collaboration and compromise than are low self-monitoring 
subordinate accountants. 
H5a: High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through collaboration than are low self-monitoring subordinate accountants. 
H5b: High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through compromise than are low self-monitoring subordinate accountants. 
 
The job and organizational contextual variables hypothesized to affect organizational 
politics in the newly developed model are the accounting superiors’ willingness to seek negative 
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performance feedback and the hierarchy of the organization.  The type of feedback sought by a 
leader has been found to matter in both how he or she acts and in others’ perceptions of those 
actions.  For example, if the superior only seeks positive feedback, the feedback should describe 
what he or she does well so that those good behaviors can be repeated.  However, the avoidance 
of negative feedback may make any weaknesses much more salient (Ashford & Tsui, 1991; 254).  
It is particularly important in attaining a reputation for good performance and leadership ability 
that a superior actively seek negative feedback, since individuals are more likely to give only 
positive feedback spontaneously and may even distort negative feedback in a positive direction 
(Ashford & Tsui, 1991; 254).  It is posited that a lack of feedback seeking, or only positive 
feedback seeking, by the superior will negatively influence the subordinate accountant’s 
perception of the organization.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H6:  Subordinate accountants that perceive their superior as either not seeking feedback 
or only seeking positive feedback will perceive the level of organizational politics 
higher than those who perceive their superior as seeking both positive and negative 
feedback from them.  
 
As previously mentioned, having more levels of vertical hierarchy in an organization is 
predicted to raise the subordinate accountant’s perception of organizational politics.  This 
prediction results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H7:  Subordinate accountants who perceive their organization as more hierarchical are 
more likely to perceive high levels of organizational politics within the organization. 
 
The preceding hypotheses predict the subordinate accountant’s perception of the 
organization's politics.  In turn, the subordinate accountant’s perception of the organization's 
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politics is posited to affect the subordinate’s perception of his or her superior’s leadership and 
performance.  The related hypotheses follow: 
 
H8:  Subordinate accountants who perceive the level of politics within the organization as 
high rate the leadership ability of their superiors lower than do subordinates who 
perceive the level of politics within the organization as low. 
 
H9:  Subordinate accountants who perceive the level of politics within the organization as 
high rate the performance of their superiors lower than do subordinates who perceive the 
level of politics within the organization as low. 
 
This completes the hypothesized relationships of the newly developed model.  The next 
section will discuss the method used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Procedures 
 
A self-developed questionnaire based upon multiple measurement scales validated in 
previous research both in and outside accounting was utilized in the current study.  The 
questionnaire appears in Appendix B.  Sample collection took place over a nine-month period.  
Sampling began with a group of professional accountants attending an accounting conference at 
a large state university in the south (Group 1).  These participants were solicited via a mailed 
request before the conference and a booth was set up at the conference so that those who wished 
to participate could do so.  The voluntary participants supplied contact information (name, 
business address, and e-mail address) for up to five additional accountants. 
Group 2 participants consisted of the contacts supplied by Group 1 participants.  Group 2 
participants received the same questionnaire.  These questionnaires included self-addressed 
stamped envelopes for return to the researcher.  Group 2 participants were also asked to supply 
additional participants.  The additional participants obtained from Group 2 participants were then 
contacted via e-mail or mail and asked to participate in the same way.  In addition, other 
participants (Group 3) were solicited via mail and personal request until the complete sample 
was obtained.  The data from the three groups were examined and compared to ensure that 
differences that might have affected the results did not exist.  Internal Review Board (IRB) 
approval (see Appendix C) and participant consent (Appendix D) were obtained.  Tsui et al. 
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(1995) used a modified version of this method in management research, as did Sosik et al. (2002) 
in psychology. 
 
 
Measures 
 
The study measured constructs found in the Tsui and Ashford (1994) adaptive self-
regulation model along with others from the perceptions of organizational politics model as well 
as perceived leadership ability and performance.  The classifications of the constructs measured 
consisted of personal, interpersonal, and contextual variables that may affect the adaptive self-
regulation of an accountant.  The measurement scales chosen for the constructs of interest are 
discussed below. 
 
 
Perceived Performance 
 
To measure performance the Reputation Expectational Effectiveness scale (REE) 
developed by Tsui (1984) was chosen.10  This three-question scale was chosen because it 
measures the extent leaders meet constituents performance expectations.  Responses ranged from 
“Not At All” to “Entirely” on a 7-point likert type scale with higher numbers indicating greater 
perceptions of perceived performance.  The internal consistency reliability estimates for the REE 
scale found by Tsui (1984) were 0.75, 0.84, 0.87, and 0.86 for self, superiors, subordinates, and 
                                                 
10 The REE questions are numbers 127-129 in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
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peers respectively for judgments of the expectation of a leader’s overall effectiveness.  This 
measurement scale was further validated in Ashford and Tsui (1991) and Tsui et al. (1995). 
 
 
Perceived Leadership Ability 
 
Transformational leadership was the measure of perceived leadership ability measured in 
this study because it has been found to have positive effects on many important organizational 
aspects such as trust, commitment, team-efficacy, and self-efficacy (Arnold et al., 2001).  In 
addition, transformational leadership coincides with the AICPA’s Vision Project’s definition of 
leadership skills: the ability to inspire, motivate, and influence others (AICPA, 2000; Viator, 
2001).  Prior research in accounting investigated the effectiveness of initiating structure and 
consideration, which are two leader behavior constructs that are transformational in nature (Pratt 
& Jiambalvo, 1981; 1982; Jiambalvo & Pratt, 1982).  For these reasons, transformational 
leadership was the measure of interest in the study. 
The two most commonly used measures of transformational leadership behaviors in the 
recent past have been the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ; Avolio, Bass, and Jung, 
1995), and the Leadership Practices Inventory (LPI; Kouzes and Posner, 1990).  The MLQ 
measures three transformational leadership behaviors, while the LPI measures five.  In contrast, 
the Global Transformational Leadership scale (GTL; Carless et al., 2000) measures a broader 
range with seven behaviors within one underlying dimension.  Largely for this reason, the Global 
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Transformational Leadership scale (GTL) was chosen over the other more commonly used 
transformational scales.11
In the Carless et al. (2000) study, principal components factor analysis showed the factor 
structure of the GTL.  The items assessed one underlying dimension of leadership with an 
eigenvalue of 5.0, which explained 71% of the variance.  The factor loadings ranged from 0.78 - 
0.88 with a mean of 0.84 (SD = .05).  Bagozzi and Heatherton (1994, 45) following the rule-of-
thumb suggested by Bentler and Bonett (1980) suggest that the relative noncentrality index 
(RNI) should exceed 0.90 to indicate a satisfactory fit and the GTL meets that criterion.  Bagozzi 
and Heatherton (1994, 63) also suggest that reliability and the average amount extracted (AVE) 
be examined in principal component factor analysis.  The reliability of the GTL was calculated to 
be 0.93 and the AVE exceeded the minimum acceptable value suggested by the literature for 
achieving a satisfactory measurement model of 0.50 (e.g., Fornell & Larker, 1981, 46) with a 
value of 0.67. 
Convergent validity was measured by the correlation among the GTL and the MLQ and 
the LPI.  The correlations of the subscales, which were determined to be similar, ranged from 
0.71 to 0.87 (Carless et al. 2000, p. 398).  The pattern of high correlations with the hypothesized 
constructs provides evidence the GTL corresponds to other measures of transformational 
leadership.  Correlations between total GTL were also comparable to scores on the MLQ and the 
LPI.  These correlations ranged between 0.76 and 0.88 with a mean of 0.83 (SD = .04).  These 
high correlations provide evidence that the GTL has strong convergent validity.  Discriminate 
validity of the GTL was measured by comparing groups who would be expected to have 
                                                 
11 The GTL questions are numbers 130-136 in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
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different scores.  T-tests show the GTL discriminates significantly between all contrasting 
groups. 
The possible range of scores on the GTL is 7 to 35 with a mean of 25 (SD = 6.76), which 
indicates that there is adequate dispersion of scores on the GTL.  The Cronbach alpha value of 
0.93 is high and supports the conclusion that the GTL is a reliable measure of transformational 
leadership.  The seven-item GTL responses were entered on a 7-point likert type scale ranging 
from “Very False to Very True”.  The higher the score reported by the accountant, the greater he 
or she perceives his or her superior’s leadership ability. 
 
 
Personality Variable 
 
 
Self-Monitoring 
 
Lennox and Wolfe’s (1984) Revised Self-Monitoring Scale as modified by O’Cass 
(2000) was chosen to measure self-monitoring.12  The reasons this scale was chosen over the 
more often used Snyder (1974) scale is due in part to criticisms of the Snyder scale and in part, 
because the more refined and efficient validated scale exists.  In addition, the current study is 
interested in the more narrow definition of self-monitoring, that of Lennox and Wolfe (1984) 
who created their scale to measure the construct as they define it.  The Lennox and Wolfe (1984) 
                                                 
12 The Revised Self-Monitoring Scale questions are numbers 19-30 in the research instrument, which appears in 
Appendix A. 
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scale restricts the concept of self-monitoring to the ability to modify self-presentation and 
sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others.  This more narrow definition than that originally 
proposed by Snyder is more reflective of the forte of high self-monitoring individuals (Lennox 
and Wolfe, 1984).  The Lennox and Wolfe scale was created over four studies wherein factor 
analysis was conducted on Snyder’s original scale to generate the items to measure the construct. 
In the original use of the Lennox and Wolfe (1984) revised self-monitoring scale it had a 
coefficient alpha of 0.75 for the 13 item total scale.  Individual coefficient alphas were 0.77 for 
the ability to monitor self-presentation factor (7 items), and 0.70 for sensitivity to the expressive 
behavior of others (6 items).  The scale has shown construct validity with related constructs.  
Table nine in Lennox and Wolfe (1984, p.1361) provides item means and standard deviations. 
During a pilot study, O’Cass (2000) found that some participants indicated problems 
interpreting the original wording of the Lennox and Wolfe revised self -monitoring scale.  
O’Cass (2000) modified the measurement instrument by changing the wording of the Lennox 
and Wolfe revised self-monitoring scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” instead 
of the Lennox and Wolfe terms “Certainly, always false” to “Certainly, always true”.  In 
addition, in the pilot portion of the O’Cass (2000) study, a principal component analysis was 
performed wherein two factors were found and one item was dropped due to low reliability and 
poor correlations with the other items.  The resultant factor structure was significant with 
loadings between .714 and .787 for self-monitoring ability and .672 and .803 for self-monitoring 
sensitivity (O’Cass, 2000).  Self-monitoring ability and self-monitoring sensitivity are the two 
variables found in prior research.  For ease of administration and the sake of efficiency, the 
current study also incorporates the O’Cass modifications and therefore consists of 12-items.  
Participants indicated their selection for the six self-monitoring ability and six self-monitoring 
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sensitivity questions on a 7-point likert type scale which ranged from “Always False” to “Always 
True”.  Higher total scores indicated higher levels of self-monitoring ability. 
 
 
Interpersonal Variables 
 
 
Power Relationships 
 
Holzbach’s attributional power index or API (Comer, 198413) was the measure of 
interpersonal power relations in an organizational environment that was used.  The scale is 
predicated on the French and Raven (1959) power base model discussed in the section on the 
theoretical development of the construct in Chapter 2.  The API measures 25 individual 
responses, and was scored, as is typically the case, on a 7-point likert type scale ranging from 
“Extremely Inaccurate” to “Extremely Accurate”.  Power indices are formed by simply summing 
the points from the five questions within each of the five dimensions discussed in the preceding 
chapter.  The higher the score within the dimension the higher that type of interrelational power. 
Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of the scale.  In the Comer (1984) 
study, the alpha values show consistency across power bases and companies.  The alpha range 
reported is as follows for each power base dimension: expert 0.89 - 0.90, reward 0.88 - 0.90, 
coercive 0.69 – 0.75, referent 0.75 – 0.90 and legitimate 0.64 - 0.76. 
                                                 
13 The API originates from the unpublished dissertation of Holzbach (1974).  The API questions are numbers 31-55 
in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
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Conflict Orientation 
 
The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode survey (1994) is the generally accepted 
measurement instrument in conflict orientation research and is used in this study.14  The Thomas-
Kilmann Conflict Mode instrument contains thirty questions.  Participants were asked to select 
one of two statements that best describe their typical behavior.  Each statement represents one of 
the five conflict orientations: collaborating, competing, compromising, accommodating, or 
avoiding.  The largest number of statements chosen which related to a particular orientation 
determined the predominant conflict mode or orientation of each individual.  There were a few 
individuals who had multiple predominate modes.  By using the actual scores for each individual 
for each possible mode, this problem was eliminated.  This treatment is consistent with others 
use of the Thomas-Kilmann instrument (Hignite et al., 2002). 
Chew and Lim (1995) used the Thomas-Kilmann instrument in a study on conflict 
resolution methods used by Chinese business managers and reported its reliability measure at 
0.72.  In that study, the authors found that 18 percent of the participants typically used a 
competing orientation, 22.2 percent used a collaborating orientation, 24.3 percent were 
compromisers, 19.3 percent avoided conflict, and 16.2 percent tended to accommodation (Chew 
& Lim, 1995; 148).  It was interesting to note that within the current study US accountants 
showed a predominant competitive orientation to a lesser extent at 12.4 percent than did their 
previously reported Chinese counterparts.  The US accountants in the current study also tended 
more toward compromise at 33.3 percent and avoidance at 27.4 percent.  In addition, current 
                                                 
14 The publisher of the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode survey requests that no portion of the survey itself appear in 
a publication.  For this reason, the questions are blanked out in the instrument that appears in Appendix A. 
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study participants exhibited accommodating and collaborating orientations less often at 13 and 
13.9 percent of the time respectively. 
 
 
Interpersonal Trust 
 
A modified version of the Kumar et al. (1995) scale as used in de Ruyter & Wetzels 
(1999) was used in the current study.15  Although there are several other trust measurement 
scales including the often-used Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967), all are much longer and 
not practical for a study of this type.  The 10-item de Ruyter and Wetzels (1999) version of the 
Kumar et al. scale was preferred in part because of its length and in part, because the constructs 
measured are appropriate for the current study.  It measures trust within working relationships as 
opposed to relationships outside the workplace, whether romantic or otherwise.  Specifically 
measuring this construct is important to this study because measuring the wrong type of trust 
may differentially affect analysis of the effects on other variables.  Trust between employees 
within a workplace is associated with a sense of integrity, a reduction of uncertainty, and a 
tendency toward the desire to maintain the relationship (de Ruyter & Wetzels, 1999; 60).  
Responses range from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” on a 7-point likert type scale.  
The higher the score the greater the accountant perceives interpersonal trust with his or her 
superior. 
 
                                                 
15 The Interpersonal Trust questions are numbers 56-65 in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
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Job & Organizational Variables 
 
 
Feedback 
 
The scale for the measurement of feedback in the study is that developed by Ashford and 
Tsui (1991 p. 264).16  The scale measures both feedback seeking (with four questions) and 
feedback-strategy (with nine questions).  Of the four feedback-seeking questions, the tendencies 
to seek positive and negative feedback are measured by two items each.  Feedback-strategy 
questions relate to direct inquiry, the monitoring of direct cues, and the monitoring of indirect 
cues and consist of three items each.  Tsui et al. (1995) used the scale and reported the goodness 
of fit index at 0.96. 
In the instructions for this scale, accountants were asked how characteristic a feedback 
behavior was within “the past six-months”.  Six months was chosen because it is consistent with 
previous research using behavioral recall (Kipnis et al., 1980).  Responses ranged from “Very 
Seldomly” to “Very Often” on a 7-point likert type scale with a higher score indicating a greater 
degree of feedback seeking. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Feedback questions are numbers 80-92 in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
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Hierarchical Structure 
 
Two questions were selected from among those used by Rizzo et al. (1970) to assess an 
individual’s perception of the hierarchy within the organization.17  The two questions ask if there 
is a high degree of upward information required and if violations in the chain of command are 
dealt with harshly at their place of work.  The responses were collected on a 7-point likert type 
scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.  For purposes of this study, if scores were 
high for both questions then the hierarchical orientation is deemed strong.  If there is neither a 
requirement for upward information nor a harsh punishment for violations of the chain of 
command then the hierarchical orientation is considered either flat or weak. 
 
 
Perception of Organizational Politics 
 
The three factor, twelve-item, Perception of Organizational Politics Scale (POPS) was 
used in this study.18  The POPS scale was adapted from the perceptions of organizational politics 
scale developed by Kacmar and Ferris (1991).  Vigoda (2000), Kacmar et al. (1999), and Kacmar 
and Carlson (1997) all used the twelve-item adaptation of the original scale finding it to be the 
most parsimonious.  The studies using the POPS scale and the original Kacmar and Ferris (1991) 
scale report internal-consistency estimates of reliability of 0.87 to 0.88.  Vigoda (2000) found 
reliability for the scale of 0.77. 
                                                 
17 The Hierarchical Structure questions are numbers 95-96 in the research instrument, which appears in Appendix A. 
18 The Perceptions of Organizational Politics questions are numbers 99-110 in the research instrument, which 
appears in Appendix A. 
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The three factors and the number of related items are general political behavior (6 items), 
going along to get along (4 items), and pay and promotion (2 items).  Responses are indicated on 
a 7-item likert type scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.  Higher scores indicate 
the perception of high levels of organizational politics.  Responses on prior studies were 
evaluated similarly but on a 5-point likert type scale.  The 7-item scale was chosen instead for 
this study due to ease of administration and to be consistent with the other measures. 
 
 
Demographic Data 
 
The demographic data, which appears in Table 1, includes the participant’s age, sex, 
marital and family status, education, work history, and accomplishments.  The participant’s were 
also asked to assess the clarity of the instrument and the time it took to complete the 
questionnaire.  In addition, participants had the opportunity to offer any additional information 
they felt was pertinent to the investigation. 
The age of the average participant was thirty-nine with the range spreading from twenty-
one to sixty-seven years of age.  More females than males, at fifty-eight percent, participated in 
the study.  This is in part attributable to a number of managing partners or equivalent that 
responded to the questionnaire but were not included in the sample because they did not have a 
superior and could therefore not answer questions about a superior.  Of these seventeen, thirteen 
were male.  Had they all been included in the current study, the percentage of females would 
have decreased to fifty-five percent.  The majority of participants at fifty-five percent reported no 
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children currently living at home.  Given that the most oft reported age was 47, this could be due 
in part to children having already left home. 
As was expected from members of the accounting profession, all but five of the 
respondents reported holding at least a bachelors degree with fifty-five percent of those reporting 
having attained a master’s degree or more.  The respondents ranged from less than a year to 
thirty-seven years experience, with slightly more than sixteen years being average.  The average 
respondent held their current position for five and a half years.  Seventy percent of the 
respondents had been employed in public accounting at some point in their career.  The average 
tenure in public accounting was slightly more than five and a half years. 
The current sample was evenly distributed among the various areas of accounting.  
Seventeen percent reported themselves to currently be employed in auditing with an additional 
twenty-four percent in tax.  Twenty-two percent were currently employed in industry, seventeen 
percent in governmental accounting, with the remainder reporting their current position in the 
other category.  Within the 40% percent reporting themselves currently employed in public 
accounting and eligible for the study19, nine percent were partners, twenty-one percent managers, 
twenty-five percent seniors, thirty-one percent staff, and the remainder reported their positions as 
other.  Of the approximately 60% reporting their current position not in public accounting, forty-
four percent were managers, twenty-two percent analysts, twenty-five percent staff , with the 
remainder reporting other. 
As far as certifications are concerned, 93 individuals reporting earning a total of ninety-
nine certifications.  Of these, the CPA certification was the most prevalent at eighty-one percent.  
                                                 
19 Ineligible respondents in public accounting were managing partners.  They were ineligible because they did not 
have a superior. 
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Four and three percent of the certifications were CMA’s and CIA’s respectively, while the rest 
reported other certifications. 
On a 7-point likert type scale, the research instrument’s clarity rating averaged 6.18.  The 
average time to complete the questionnaire was twenty-eight minutes with a range of fifteen to 
fifty minutes.  I found no trend in the voluntary comments or anything to assist this particular 
investigation.  However, valuable suggestions for future research investigations were offered.  
Once the data were collected using the procedure and measures described previously, the 
analysis was conducted, the results of which appear in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Nine constructs were hypothesized to have an effect on subordinate accountants’ 
perceptions of their superiors’ leadership ability and performance, as mediated by perceptions of 
organizational politics (POP).  These nine constructs are self-monitoring level, subordinate-
superior trust relationships, subordinate-superior power relationships, the superior’s feedback-
seeking type, organizational hierarchical structure, and the following four conflict resolution 
orientations: avoiding, compromising, competitive, and collaborative.  Overall, all relationships 
except those involving the conflict orientation constructs are statistically significant and in the 
hypothesized direction. 
Descriptive statistics of the scales and measurement indicators that were used appear in 
Table 2.  Reliability analysis was conducted using SPSS Version 12.0.1. and Cronbach’s alpha 
was computed as the primary reliability test statistic.  The data were first screened for outliers 
and evidence of a linear relationship and were found to be acceptable.  Before deleting any 
indicators, the alpha coefficients of the variables with multiple indicators ranged from 0.585 to 
0.927.  The 2-indicator variable “Pay and Promotion” from the POP’s scale was excluded from 
further analysis because it failed to meet the acceptable reliability criteria cutoff of 0.7020 as well 
as factoring properly during the later confirmatory factor analysis stage.  All other factorable 
variables and retained indicators met the reliability acceptance criteria. 
Correlations of the relationships between the variables that relate to each hypotheses were 
conducted next.  The Pearson’s correlation coefficient results of this analysis can be found in 
                                                 
20 A high Cronbach alpha indicates good internal consistency of the items in the scale, but it does not assess 
dimensionality.  George and Mallery (2003, p231) provide the following rule of thumb: > .90=Excellent, > 
.80=Good,  >.70=Acceptable, > .60=Questionable, >.50=Poor, < .50=Unacceptable. 
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Table 3.21  With few exceptions, statistically significant correlations provided preliminary 
support for the hypothesized relationships. 
Before analysis of the model or testing of the hypotheses, the correlation matrix of the 
hypothesized constructs was analyzed (see Table 5).  Note from this matrix that the antecedent 
constructs of power relationships and trust relationships, as well as perceptions of organizational 
politics are significantly related to both of the outcome variables (the superior’s performance and 
leadership ability as perceived by subordinates) in the expected direction.  Those same 
antecedent constructs, power relationships and trust relationships are also significantly related to 
perceptions of politics, again in the hypothesized direction.  Further, multivariate analysis will 
reveal whether these relationships are direct or indirect and mediated.  The antecedent feedback 
type, is also significantly related to leadership ability but not to performance. 
Once the relationships between the independent and dependent variables was determined 
the next step in the analysis was to find out if the relationship between the hypothesized 
antecedent constructs and the outcome variables, leadership ability and performance, is largely 
due to perceptions of organizational politics.  In other words, to determine if those relationships 
are partially or fully mediated by the perceptions of politics construct.  To address these 
questions hierarchical regressions were run predicting leadership ability first by the hypothesized 
antecedent constructs (non-mediated column of Table 6), then by adding perceptions of politics 
in the second step.  This can be seen in the mediated column of Table 6.  The R2 when the 
hypothesized antecedent constructs were the only measures was .666. It increases to .689 with 
the addition of perceptions of organizational politics.  The overall change in R2 was significant at 
                                                 
21 Pearson’s correlation coefficient is a measure of linear association.  As such, it is not the appropriate statistic for 
measuring non-linear associations.  For this reason Spearman’s rho, which is a measure of association that does not 
require a linear association was also conducted and the results were equivalent. 
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the .001 level.  The coefficients for the power and trust variables remain significant in the 
mediated model which indicates that their effects are not fully mediated by the perceptions of 
politics variable. 
The second set of  hierarchical regressions were run predicting performance first by the 
hypothesized antecedent constructs (non-mediated column of Table 7), then by perceptions of 
politics in the second step.  This can be seen in the mediated column of Table 7.  The R2 when 
the hypothesized antecedent constructs were the only measures was .652. It increases to .665 
with the addition of perceptions of organizational politics.  The overall change in R2 was 
significant at the .016 level.  As is evident from the regression analysis, the inclusion of 
perceptions of organizational politics as a predictor (the mediated column) causes changes for 
the antecedents on the dependent variable leadership ability.  As with the regression on 
leadership ability the greatest changes are obviously the constructs power relationships and trust 
relationships. 
 
 
Structural Equation Modeling 
 
After the preliminary data analysis and data testing, structural equation modeling (SEM) 
was used to test the proposed model and to evaluate the hypotheses.  SEM is commonly 
employed for the fitting and testing of causal relationships in non-experimental data between 
variable/constructs as measured by multiple indicators.  Given an appropriate sample SEM is a 
more powerful alternative to multiple regression, path analysis, factor analysis, and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).  The two main steps to the SEM 
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process, as further discussed below, are validating the measurement model and fitting the 
structural model. 
SEM was proposed for the current study because the currently theorized model is viewed 
as an antecedent and consequence nomological framework for performance and leadership 
ability.  Due to the desire to account for measurement error and the large number of indicators, a 
partial aggregation approach as proposed by Bagozzi and Heatherton (1994) was used. In 
summary, the approach entails summing the items that compose a construct to form a single, 
aggregate scale for the whole construct.  This approach is based on the work of Kenny (1979) 
and James et al. (1982).  It has also been well supported in a variety of academic disciplines: 
(Netemeyer et al., 1990; Osterhus, 1997; Settoon et al., 1996; Williams & Hazer, 1986).  
Netemeyer et al. (1990) reports that the results are approximately the same as a latent model with 
multiple indicators.  Finally, the approach deals with problems occurring with the use of SEM 
with multiple indicators with a relatively small sample size (Hom & Griffith, 1991). 
A weakness of this approach is that the quality of the construct measurement cannot be 
explicitly assessed (Baumgartner & Homberg, 1996).  To control for this, and as reported above, 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was the first stage of the analysis (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Heide & John, 1992; Kumar et al., 1994).  CFA takes care of 
any potential problem with interpretational confounding (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Williams 
& Hazer, 1986).  Interpretational confounding is the occurrence of distorted structural parameters 
by simultaneously estimating measurement or structural models. 
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Validating the Measurement Model - Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
As indicated above, CFA was first used to differentiate component constructs and to 
concurrently assess the convergent and discriminate validities of indicants of the constructs 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988).  In CFA, each latent variable is allowed to correlate freely with 
every other latent variable; causal relationships are not specified; the measurement model is 
estimated; reliability and validity are assessed.  Due to the large number of constructs and the 
relatively small sample, the initial CFA was conducted using SPSS Version 12.0.1 on the 
constructs as per prior research (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; Comer, 1984; Thomas-Kilmann, 1994; 
Kumar, 1995;Ashford & Tsui, 1991; Kacmar & Ferris, 1991; Tsui, 1984; Carless, 2000).  With 
one exception (hierarchical structure) as mentioned in Chapter 3, the indicator variables for the 
constructs have been shown to be reliable and valid in previous research.  For the construct 
hierarchical structure, only two individual items on the questionnaire served as the indicator 
variables.  This low number of items is generally less desirable due to the lower reliability over 
the composite scores.  However, given the constraints of this study (no well-developed 
alternative measure; the complications of the sixteen other instruments), these two individual 
questions related to hierarchical structure that were available were used.  Using principal 
component analysis supplemented by principal axis factoring extraction methods and various 
rotation methods, all variables that could be confirmed via CFA were.  Due to the non-interval, 
non-ordinal, non-dichotomous nature of the measurement scale, conflict orientation was the 
exception.  This exception is more fully discussed below. 
The presumed endogenous variables loaded on the appropriate factors with the loss of 
only two questions.  Using principal component analysis extraction methodology, the indicators 
  46
for Variable 1, “performance”, loaded on one factor as anticipated.  The loadings ranged from 
.902 to .924 and the total variance explained was 84.03 percent.  Using the same extraction 
method, the indicators for Variable 2, “leadership ability”, also loaded appropriately on one 
factor with loadings ranging from .797 to .889.  The total variance explained was 69.97 percent.  
The final endogenous construct, perceptions of organizational politics, loaded to two factors 
using principal components analysis and the promax rotation methodology.  Although three 
factors were expected, the communalities of the two questions relating to “pay and promotion” 
issues did not reach the minimum acceptable level of .40.  In addition, as mentioned previously, 
the variable did not as a whole meet the required alpha level of .70.  The fact that this variable, 
“pay and promotion”, had only two indicators may have contributed to this failure.22  The 
remaining two factors, Variable 3, “general POP”, and Variable 4, “going along to get along”, 
had POP loadings ranged between .649 to .836 and .727 to .863, respectively.  The total variance 
explained was 60.79 percent. 
For the self-monitoring construct, the initial factor analysis (via principal component 
analysis with promax rotation) revealed the anticipated two-factor structure as proposed by 
Lennox and Wolfe (1984).  Variable 5, “self-monitoring ability”, had factor loadings ranging 
from .706 to .841.  Variable 6, “self-monitoring sensitivity”, had factor loadings ranging from 
.698 to .850.  The total variance explained by the two self-monitoring factors was 62.42 percent. 
The five-factor solution found in prior literature for the power construct was attained only 
after considerable manipulation.  One question from the “coercive-power” variable (#23) was 
dropped because its communality was .318 and the generally accepted minimum level is .400 
                                                 
22 Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients normally range between 0 and 1 and are partially dependent upon the 
number of items in the scale.  However, it should be noted that there are diminishing returns to increasing the 
number of items.   
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(Hatcher, 1994).  The loss of that particular question was anticipated due to the wording of the 
question.  An additional question (#26) was deleted from the “legitimate-power” variable 
because inclusion of that question prompted the questions pertaining to “legitimate power” to 
rotate to two factors, causing the entire construct to cross-factor.  Cross-factoring occurs when 
questions expected to load on a specific factor load on multiple factors.  Once those two 
questions were dropped, the five-factor solution was attained through principal component 
analysis with promax rotation.  The factor loadings for Variable 7, “expert-power”, ranged from 
.794 to .932.  The factor loadings for Variable 8, “reward-power”, ranged from .706 to .914.  
“Coercive-power”, Variable 9, had factor loadings ranging from .720 to .861.  “Referent-power”, 
Variable 10, had factor loadings ranging from .719 to .847.  The final power variable was 
“legitimate-power”, Variable 11, and it had factor loadings ranging from .646 to .877.  The total 
variance explained by the CFA was 72.35 percent. 
The CFA was performed using principal component analysis with varimax rotation for 
the trust construct.  It led to three of the questions relating to honesty being dropped from the 
analysis.  Once these questions were excluded, Variable 12, “trust-honesty”, had factor loadings 
ranging from .646 to .938.  All questions for Variable 13, “trust-benevolence”, were retained and 
the loadings ranged from .771 to .883.  The total variance explained however, was an impressive 
76.77 percent.23
As previously mentioned, the construct conflict-orientation was measured on a non-likert 
type scale, one not readily adaptable to interval measure.  An attempt was made based on the 
theory of Thomas (1988) to adapt the data to an interval measure.  In scoring the conflict-mode 
                                                 
23 Explanation of 50 to 75% of the total variation is generally desired.  However, explanation of greater than 75% is 
superior. 
  48
instrument, the TKI, each time an individual answers a question that shows or exhibits a 
particular conflict orientation a tally is made for that orientation.  Typically, the scores for each 
conflict orientation are summed, the individual is deemed to exhibit a certain amount/degree of 
each conflict orientation.  Although one orientation is typically predominant, most people exhibit 
some degree of all the conflict orientations.  In order to accommodate the needed interval 
measure for use in structural equation modeling (all other measures are on a 7-point likert type 
scale), the conflict orientations were given scores ranging from 1-5 according to the degree of 
assertiveness and cooperativeness, as characterized by Thomas.  Given the generally held belief 
that individuals are more self-interested than altruistic, assertiveness, or the attempt to satisfy 
one’s own concerns, is given precedence over cooperativeness, the attempt to satisfy others’ 
concerns. 
The avoiding conflict orientation, with its low level of assertiveness and cooperativeness, 
received a one on the five-point likert type scale.  The accommodating conflict orientation, while 
still low on assertiveness, was high on cooperation and received a two on the five-point scale.  
The compromising conflict orientation falls right in the middle of each dimension and therefore 
received a three on the scale.  The competitive orientation, with its high level of assertiveness 
and low level of cooperativeness, received a four on the scale.  Finally, the collaborating conflict 
orientation, with its high levels of both assertiveness and cooperativeness, received a five on the 
scale.  The CFA failed to confirm the five-factor structure as found in prior research.  Given the 
forced nature of this interval measure (actually having only two choices for each survey item 
rather than five), the relatively small data set, and the five-factor findings from prior research, the 
five factors as previously found were analyzed. 
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As was found in prior research, the CFA revealed two sets of independent feedback 
variables, feedback type and feedback strategy (Ashford and Tsui, 1991).  Using principal 
component analysis with promax rotation, Variable 19, “positive-feedback type”, was found to 
have factor loadings that ranged from .889 to .905.  Variable 20, “negative-feedback type”, had 
factor loadings that ranged from .915 to .922.  The variance explained totaled 83.43 percent.  
Using principal components analysis with a varimax rotation with the second set of feedback 
variables, the strategy variables had the following loadings: Variable 21, “inquiry-feedback 
strategy”, .862 to .902; Variable 22, “direct cue-feedback strategy”, .617-.906; Variable 23, 
“indirect cue-feedback strategy”, .889-.904.  One indirect cue question was dropped from the 
analysis because inclusion caused cross loadings.  The total variance explained by the feedback 
strategy set of variables was 79.88 percent. 
The final exogenous construct analyzed was hierarchical structure.  However, the 
construct failed the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy with a score of 
.500.  This may have been caused by a combination of it being only a two-item construct and 
having a low communality.  According to generally accepted practice, the KMO must exceed 
.600 and preferably .700 for factor analysis (Hatcher, 1994). 
In an attempt to assess the discriminate validity of the constructs within the model, CFA 
was performed on the entire model.  However, due to the large number of constructs and 
relatively small sample size, a satisfactory CFA of all constructs and variables at one time was 
not attained.  Even though this attempted analysis did result in some cross-loadings, there were 
no strong correlations.  Once a larger sample is obtained, the CFA on the entire model will again 
be attempted to determine if the nine constructs and 25 variables will show the appropriate 
discriminate validity.  Summated results of the CFA’s discussed above appear in Table 4. 
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Fitting the Structural Model 
 
The proposed structural equation model is the theoretical model and appears in Figure 2.  
As was evidenced by the confirmatory factor analysis the model as proposed did not have 
acceptable fit indices.24  After many fit adjustments, a model with a better overall fit that still 
meets a majority of the theorized propositions was found.  The fitted model appears in Figure 4.  
Although there exist any number of acceptable models with equally good fit indices, the purpose 
is to determine if the theoretical model successfully accounts for the relationships in the sample 
data. 
Procedures from SAS’s CALIS process to test nonstandard path models with both 
manifest and latent variables were employed.  These procedures, referred to as SEM or 
covariance structural modeling, are appropriate for nonstandard multiple-indicator models 
(Bentler, 1990).  A number of procedures and statistics exist to assess the extent to which a 
model fits the data.  Even though this research stream is in its infancy, it is still necessary that a 
model meet the criteria.  It was necessary to disaggregate the constructs into their individual 
variables in order to find a model with good fit indices.  Again, a larger sample relative to the 
number of variables and/or constructs studied is expected to help mitigate this issue in the future.  
Evidence of the fitted model meeting the criteria for acceptance is presented below. 
The goal in SEM is to evaluate whether the proposed associations fit the present data set.  
The Chi-square statistics as well as other fit indices measure this fit.  The first step in 
ascertaining an acceptable model is to review the Chi-square statistics to determine if the Chi-
                                                 
24 Explanation of fit indices is available in next section.  Overall fit statistics are GFI = .9270, AGFI = .6912, Chi-
Square 93.5406, 13 df (p=0.001), CFI = .8732, NFI = .8624, and NNFI .5609. 
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square is significant.  A non-significant Chi-square shows support for the tested model.  
However, a significant Chi-square does not necessarily indicate a bad fit.  In addition, too small a 
sample size for the Chi-square can inaccurately indicate a close fit.  Indication of a good overall 
fit is a small Chi-square and a relatively large p value.  At a minimum, the p value should exceed 
the standard .01 or .05 and the closer to 1.00 it is the better.  The fitted model’s Chi-square was 
66.9493 with 39 df (p = 0.0035).  The Chi-square test is sensitive to departures from multivariate 
normality, sample size, and even the complexity of the model (Hatcher, 1994).  Since in some 
cases the Chi-square test may indicate rejection when in fact the model fits reasonably well, 
other indices were considered.  To obtain reliable results the sample size should be at least five 
times the number of parameters.  The fitted model has 31 parameters, so a sample of 169 
observations should be large enough by a small margin.  However, the model as theorized had 
many more parameters and therefore not enough observations. 
 Due to criticism of the Chi-square statistic alone as a “goodness of fit” measure, 
additional “goodness of fit” measures are evaluated in step two.  Values for the Normed Fit 
Index (NFI) (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) range from zero to one, those over 0.90 indicate a good fit.  
The fitted model performs well with a .9665.  The NFI can however have the opposite problem 
of the Chi-square with a small sample, in that it can underestimate the goodness-of-fit.  To 
alleviate this issue Bentler and Bonnet (1980) also propose presenting the Non-Normed Fit Index 
(NNFI), because sample size is less problematic.  The NNFI is considered a good fit if it exceeds 
0.90.  The NNFI for the fitted model exceeds this requirement also with a .9542. 
In 1990, Bentler introduced the revised comparative fit index (CFI), based on the NFI but 
with a correction for small sample sizes.  The fitted model boasts a .9851 CFI, which also 
exceeds the required .90.  For the adjusted fit index (AFI) (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1984), 
  52
researchers also typically seek a .90.  The fitted model comes close with a .8550.  The AFI is 
sensitive to large numbers of manifest variables and small degrees of freedom, both present in 
the current study. 
Step three of the analysis of fit is to review the R2 of any endogenous F variables.25  
Within the fitted model, the only latent endogenous F variable is the construct of perceptions of 
organizational politics with an R2 of .7046.  This indicates that the independent variables retained 
in the fitted model account for 70.46 percent of the variance in the construct perceptions of 
organizational politics.26  Within the fitted model, the manifest endogenous variables 
“performance” and “leadership ability” have R2  values of .7642 and .8274 respectively. 
The fourth step in the analysis is to review the residual matrix and then the normalized 
residual matrix.  If the fitted model successfully accounts for the actual causal relationships 
between the variables or constructs, then the residual matrix should contain zeros or close to it.  
Examination of the normalized residuals for the fitted model shows zeros for all relationships 
except those where the independent exogenous variables also have a direct effect on the 
endogenous variables.  These paths were not added to the fitted model, as the absolute values of 
the entries in the normalized residual matrix do not exceed the general recommendation of 2.58.  
These direct relationships will be the subject of future research. 
The overall fit statistics provide consistent support for the fitted model.  The final step is 
to review significance tests for path coefficients and covariances.  For instance, the significance 
                                                 
25 F variables are the latent constructs.  In this instance F3 is the latent construct perceptions of organizational 
politics which is measured by variable 3 “General Political Behavior” and variable 4 “Going Along to Get Along”. 
26 The independent variables retained that account for the variance in the perceptions of organizational politics are: 
V3-General Political Behavior and V4-Going Along to Get Along from the PP’s scale itself, V8-Reward Power and 
V10-Referent Power from the PR scale, V12-Honesty Trust from the TR scale, V14-Collaboration an V18-
Avoidance from the CO scale, and V19-FBtypePos, V20-FBtypeNeg, V21-FBstratagyinquiry, V22-
FBstratagydirect, all from the FB scale. 
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tests for both the path coefficient and the covariance of the constructs or variables performance 
and perceptions of organizational politics were examined.  Significance tests for all other 
combinations of constructs and/or variables were also reviewed.  The standard errors for the path 
coefficients were acceptable (not too close to zero) (Hatcher, 1994).  The t values for the 
manifest variable equations were highly significant.  However, there were some insignificant t 
values relating to the path coefficients for the latent variable equation.  A significant t value is 
1.96 at the .05 level; several of the variables came in slightly under significance (see Figure 4).  
An alternative model was fitted with the insignificant variables deleted and an additional path 
added as was called for in the fitting of the alternative model.  The overall fit statistics changed 
so negligibly that a decision was made to retain the more theoretically grounded fitted model.  
The early stage of this research stream as well as the relatively small number of observations for 
the large number of variables contributed to this decision.27  With a larger number of 
observations, it is possible that the variables that factored correctly within the CFA may be added 
back to the model, refitted, and perform as anticipated.  The results from testing the hypotheses 
follow. 
 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 
 As originally proposed, multiple statistical methods were used to analyze the hypotheses.  
The use of several statistical methodologies, all giving virtually the same results, lend support to 
                                                 
27 Chi-Square 31.6052 with 29 df (p = 0.3375), GFI .9824, AGFI .8724, CFI .9988, NNFI .9925 
. 
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the validity of the research.  The methods chosen were those appropriate for each hypothesis and 
include correlations, t-tests, regression analysis, and SEM. 
 
Hypothesis One 
 
 In order to conduct a t-test for the first hypothesis, restated below, division of self-
monitoring individuals into two groups is required.  
 
H1:  Subordinate accountants with high and low levels of self-monitoring perceive their 
organization’s politics differently. 
 
Dividing the sample of self-monitoring individuals into two groups by the mean resulted in a 
group of 96 high self-monitoring individuals and 72 low self-monitoring individuals.  The t-test 
of the two groups resulted in support for H1.  The mean of the high self-monitoring group was 
34.77 and the mean for the low self-monitoring group was 36.49.  The difference between these 
means is significant (p < .001).  A path for self-monitoring did not remain within the fitted SEM, 
therefore no SEM results are reported related to this hypothesis. 
 
 
Hypothesis Two 
 
The second hypothesis and its testable subcomponenets, as restated below, proposes a 
negative relationship between interpersonal trust relationships and perceptions of organizational 
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politics (H2a) and a positive relationship between trust relationships and leadership ability (H2b) 
as well as between trust relationships and leadership ability (H2c). 
 
H2:  Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors perceive 
organizational politics to be low and the performance and leadership ability of their 
superiors to be high. 
H2a: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive politics to be relatively low. 
H2b: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive the leadership ability of their superiors to be relatively high. 
H2c: Subordinate accountants with high trust relationships with their supervisors 
perceive the performance of their superiors to be relatively high. 
 
Linear regression revealed the expected inverse relationship between trust relationships 
and perceptions of organizational politics, with a t-statistic of 7.709 (p < .001).  Regression 
results also support the positive relationship between trust relationships and perceived 
performance with a t-statistic of 12.197 (p < .001) and between trust relationships and leadership 
ability, with a t-statistic of 14.252 (p < .001).  The bivariate correlations between the constructs 
support the regression results. 
SEM results show that the standardized path coefficient (0.1966) in the fitted model 
supports the inverse relationship between “Trust-Honesty” and perceptions of organizational 
politics with a significant  t-value of 3.1783.  In the fitted model, the latent construct of trust is 
represented by one manifest variable, Variable 12, “Trust-honesty”.  However, the linear 
regression and bivariate correlation include an additional variable, Variable 13, “Trust-
Benevolence”.   There is not a direct path between any variable from the trust construct and 
either leadership ability or performance.   The collection of more data will potentially result in 
the inclusion of all variables and constructs in a fitted model. 
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SEM also shows statistically significant path coefficients from perceptions of 
organizational politics to both perceived performance and leadership ability.  The standardized 
path coefficients and their t-values are .6275 (9.8785) and .7746 (19.2195) respectively. 
 
 
Hypothesis Three 
 
In order to test hypothesis three’s subcomponents, the variable, coercive power, was 
reverse scored.  In doing so, good, or appropriate, power relationships consist of an overall 
measure of high levels of the following; expert power, referent power, legitimate power, and 
reward power, and a low level of coercive power.  Hypothesis three and its testable 
subcomponents are restated below: 
 
H3:  Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors perceive 
organizational politics to be low and the performance and leadership ability of their 
superiors to be high. 
H3a: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive organizational politics to be low. 
H3b: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive the leadership ability of their superiors to be relatively high. 
H3c: Subordinate accountants with good power relationships with their superiors 
perceive the performance of their superiors to be relatively high. 
 
Linear regression reveals the expected inverse relationship of power relationships to 
perceptions of organizational politics.  The t-test is significant at 6.297 (p < .001).  The 
standardized path coefficients from the fitted structural equation model are .5215 for Variable 8, 
“Reward Power”, and .1396 for Variable 10, “Referent Power” to perceptions of organizational 
  57
politics.  Both relationships are inversely associated as expected.  Although the standardized path 
coefficient for Variable 8, “Reward Power”, is significant with a t-value of 7.0946 the 
standardized path coefficient for Variable 10, “Referent Power” does not reach significance with 
a t-value of 1.2512.  The path for Variable 10, “Referent Power” was left in the fitted model 
because excluding it did not increase the fit of the model.  This particular variable also directly 
affects both outcome variables, perceived performance and leadership ability in the fitted model.  
The direct path between Variable 10, “Referent Power” and leadership ability had a standardized 
path coefficient of 0.3286 and was significant with a t-value of 4.1637 (p < .001).  The direct 
path between Variable 10, “Referent Power” and performance had a standardized path 
coefficient of 0.1930 and was significant with a t-value of 2.1980 (p < .001).   
 
 
Hypothesis Four 
 
Hypothesis 4 and its testable subcomponents are restated below: 
 
H4:  Subordinate accountants’ conflict orientation style affects their perception of 
organizational politics. 
H4a: Subordinate accountants with collaborating conflict orientation styles perceive 
organizational politics to be low. 
H4b: Subordinate accountants with avoiding conflict orientation styles perceive 
organizational politics to be low. 
H4c: Subordinate accountants with competitive conflict orientation styles perceive 
organizational politics to be high. 
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As previously discussed, an inverse relationship was anticipated for H4a.  Linear 
regression of collaborating conflict orientations on perceptions of organizational politics supports 
the negative relationship.  However, the relationship was not statistically significant. 
An inverse relationship was also expected for H4b.  However, linear regression shows an 
insignificant but positive relationship for the avoiding conflict orientation and perception of 
organizational politics.  Differences in self-monitoring levels may have affected this result.  High 
self-monitoring individuals may be aware of organizational politics but do not believe they have 
the power or the capability to change things and/or they believe it is not in their best interest to 
attempt to do so.  Their solution, rather than to deal with the conflicts inherent in the workplace, 
is to avoid them.  If this is the case, then it accounts for the positive relationship found.  The fact 
that the positive association is not significant, insinuates that separate analyses of the two factors 
within the self-monitoring construct, ability and sensitivity, are necessary to determine any 
effects on the avoidance conflict mode and the resultant perception of organizational politics.  
This analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation and is the topic of a future research paper. 
A positive relationship was expected for H4c, the relationship between competitive 
conflict orientations and perceptions of organizational politics.  Again, the result of the linear 
regression was contrary to the prediction, though insignificant.  This finding may also result from 
an interaction between self-monitoring level and conflict orientation style.  Low self-monitoring 
individuals with competitive conflict orientations might view any organizational politics as high 
because they are incapable of adapting and, as such, they are frustrated by their inability to 
successfully work within what they perceive as a high level of organizational politics.  The high 
self-monitoring individual may use a competitive conflict orientation as a way to win.  Since the 
competitive individual’s primary focus is on personal gain, with little interest in others well 
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being, manipulating within the organization’s political environment might at times serve as a 
useful tool to achieve the desired “win”.  As part of what some might term “the problem”, the 
high self-monitoring competitive individual may in fact fail to perceive organizational politics 
negatively, as tested in this dissertation.  As mentioned in H4b this proposed interaction effect is 
the subject of a future research paper. 
The fitted structural equation model retains only two of the conflict orientation variables, 
collaboration, and avoidance.  Related to H4a, the standardized path coefficient in the fitted 
model is 0.1037 for the path between collaborating conflict orientations and perceptions of 
organizational politics.  Related to H4b, the standardized path coefficient in the fitted model is 
0.0648 for the path between avoiding conflict orientations and perceptions of organizational 
politics.  While both relationships were posited to be inverse or negative relationships, the fitted 
model shows both to be positive, although neither was significant.  Interpretation of these 
findings is problematic for several reasons.  Firstly, the measure was not an interval measure.  
Secondly, the sample was not large enough for the number of variables analyzed.  Finally, only 
two of the conflict orientation variables within the construct made it into the fitted model.  
Inclusion of the remaining three conflict orientation variables would change the standardized 
path coefficients and perhaps even the signs of the relationships since the results were 
insignificant.  In light of these findings, both the measure used to obtain individual’s conflict 
orientations as well as the theory used to develop the hypotheses will be reevaluated in future 
studies. 
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Hypothesis Five 
 
Tests for significance on H5a and H5b individually reveal partial support.  The 
hypotheses are restated below: 
 
H5:  High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through collaboration and compromise than are low self-monitoring 
subordinate accountants. 
H5a: High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through collaboration than are low self-monitoring subordinate accountants. 
H5b: High self-monitoring subordinate accountants are more likely to resolve work 
conflicts through compromise than are low self-monitoring subordinate accountants. 
 
Linear regression of collaboration on high self-monitoring individuals was conducted to 
test H5a.  The expected positive association had a significant t-value of 2.294 (p<.05).  The 
linear regression for H5b, compromise on high-self-monitoring individuals, resulted in a 
negative though insignificant relationship.  The bivariate correlation shown in Table 3 lend 
support to the linear regression for H5a at the same level of statistical significance.  As occurred 
with the linear regression, the bivariate correlation also failed to support H5b.  Although weak, 
the direction of the correlation was also negative (-0.025).  As mentioned previously the 
construct of self-monitoring was not retained in the selected fitted model hence standardized path 
coefficients relevant to H5a and H5b are not reported. 
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 Hypothesis Six 
 
Analysis for hypothesis 6, restated below, supports the hypothesis.  Individuals were 
grouped by the type of feedback seeking from subordinates, as perceived by their subordinates.  
Group one, consists of those individuals that were perceived by their subordinates to seek high 
levels of both positive and negative feedback from their subordinates.  Group two individuals 
seek high levels of positive feedback but not negative feedback.  Group three individuals do not 
seek either type of feedback to any extent.  Group four individuals seek high levels of negative 
feedback and low levels of positive feedback (this group is not pertinent to this hypothesis). 
 
H6:  Subordinate accountants that perceive their superior as either not seeking feedback 
or only seeking positive feedback will perceive the level of organizational politics 
higher than those who perceive their superior as seeking both positive and negative 
feedback from them. 
 
Comparison of the means for groups one, two, and three were conducted via t-tests.  It was 
expected and found, that the mean of group one’s perception of organizational politics (34.29) is 
lower than the means of either group two (40.95) or group three (36.72).  The t-tests reveal that 
the differences in the mean of group one has a t-value of 25.645 (p<.001), the difference for 
group 2 a t-value 21.832 (p<.001), and finally the difference for group 3 a t-value 21.308 
(p<.001).  No paths remain within the fitted SEM model relevant to this hypothesis; as such, 
there are no SEM results to report. 
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Hypothesis Seven 
 
In evaluating hypothesis 7, restated below, several issues were revealed that may have 
had an impact on the results. 
 
H7:  Subordinate accountants who perceive their organization as more hierarchical are 
more likely to perceive high levels of organizational politics within the organization. 
 
As mentioned previously, two questions measured the construct of hierarchical structure.  
Feedback from participants as well as an examination of the responses to the two questions led to 
the belief that one of the questions, Variable 24, did not adequately measure the construct.  
However, linear regression conducted on the remaining variable, Variable 25, revealed a 
significant positive relationship with perceptions of organizational politics.  The t-statistic was 
2.175 (p < .05).  Neither question from the hierarchical structure construct made it into the fitted 
structural equation model, therefore, standardized path coefficients are not reported. 
 
 
Hypothesis Eight 
 
The test of hypothesis 8, restated below, was anticipated to reveal a negative relationship 
between perceptions of organizational politics and perceptions of a superior’s leadership ability.  
 
H8:  Subordinate accountants who perceive the level of politics within the organization as 
high rate the leadership ability of their superiors lower than do subordinates who 
perceive the level of politics within the organization as low. 
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 Linear regression supports the hypothesis by confirming the inverse relationship of 
perceptions of organizational politics to perceptions of leadership ability with a statistically 
significant t-value of 8.442 (p < .001).  The fitted structural equation model strongly supports the 
linear regression with a standardized path coefficient of .7746 and a t-value of 19.2195. 
 
 
Hypothesis Nine 
 
Hypothesis 9, restated below, was also expected to reveal a negative relationship, this 
time between perceptions of organizational politics and perceptions of a superior’s performance. 
 
H9:  Subordinate accountants who perceive the level of politics within the organization as 
high rate the performance of their superiors lower than do subordinates who perceive the 
level of politics within the organization as low. 
 
Linear regression confirms the inverse relationship and supports the hypothesis with a 
statistically significant t-value of 7.531 (p < .001).  The fitted structural equation model also 
strongly supports the regression of perceptions of organizational politics on perceptions of 
performance with a standardized path coefficient of .6275 and a corresponding t-value of 9.8785. 
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Overall Significance of Results 
 
Regression analysis and t-tests show that, with few exceptions28, the hypotheses are 
supported at statistically significant levels.  The exceptions to statistically significant support are 
related to two constructs, conflict orientation, and hierarchical structure.  In addition to the 
potential reasons for the adverse or insignificant findings discussed above, there were problems 
with the two measures used (also discussed above), which will be addressed in future research. 
The structural equation model as proposed was not applicable to all hypotheses.  Of those 
applicable, the results for all except those related to hypothesis 4 (which includes the problematic 
construct conflict-orientation) lend support to the regression analyses and t-tests.  The reader is 
cautioned to interpret the results from the fitted structural equation model with care until a larger 
sample is obtained and/or variables are dropped from the model.  As this research stream 
develops, results from a fitted structural equation model should become much more reliable. 
The results presented in this dissertation lend support for the interweaving of elements of 
the adaptive self-regulation model and the perceptions of organizational politics model as an 
appropriate representation of the work lives of today’s accountant.  The fitted structural equation 
model, although not completely satisfying, performed reasonably well given the large number of 
variables and relatively small sample size.  The concluding chapter further summarizes the 
contributions of this dissertation as well as listing both limitations and a partial future research 
agenda. 
                                                 
28 The exceptions were hypothesis H4a (not significant), H4b and H4c (wrong sign), H5b (not significant), and H7 
(significant with disturbing variable deleted). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY 
 
In summary, personal, interpersonal, and organizational variables are important in the 
prevalence and manner of adaptive self-regulation in terms of reputation for performance and 
leadership.  Effective leadership or management recognizes the contexts where self-regulation is 
desirable or essential.  In dynamic contexts, such as that of today’s accountant organizational 
control systems cannot nor would it be desirable for them to, fully pre-specify appropriate 
behavior.  Thus, accountants who appropriately control their own behavior should perform 
better.  This suggests the need to further understand the nature of individual self-initiated control 
systems and was a motivator for this dissertation. 
Previous research in managerial effectiveness considered ‘role fulfillment’ a relevant 
variable.  One of the models currently under study, the adaptive self-regulation model, stresses 
the actual processes that individuals engage in to fulfill their various roles.  In doing so, the 
model identifies others’ perceptions of the various activities that effective accountants may 
undertake across a variety of settings. 
The model investigated integrates several processes discussed in separate literatures.  For 
example, Ashford and Cummings (1983) and Ashford (1986) discuss the feedback seeking 
process.  This model relates feedback seeking to the processes used by leaders to manage others’ 
perceptions of them, specifically their performance and leadership ability.  In addition, the model 
incorporates influence strategies, impression management, social cognition, organizational 
feedback processes, and structure.  The model helps to determine where accounting leaders 
might leave out important steps or individuals in the adaptive self-regulation process.  The focus 
is on how individual accountants manage their relationships with members in the social structure. 
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This study adds to the model of adaptive self-regulation the role that individual’s 
perceptions of organizational politics play in perceptions of a superior’s performance and 
leadership.  This study contributes the application of the Tsui and Ashford (1994) Adaptive Self-
Regulation Model to the accounting profession as well as adding perceptions of organizational 
politics to that model.  The results of this study, which investigates accountants’ work lives, 
support the majority of the hypothesized relationships discussed above.  With these findings, the 
profession has the opportunity to better select, better place, and better train its members to 
maximize performance (Vigoda, 2000; Christensen et al., 1997; Chatman, 1991).  In addition, 
self-knowledge, a valuable tool for improving processes, should increase.  The profession can 
benefit by making the appropriate assignments, as well as setting appropriate standards and 
organizational processes. 
A major limitation of the use of the adaptive self-regulation framework and perceptions 
of organizational politics, along with all other models used to examine the accounting profession, 
is the ability to simultaneously examine societal affects, which exist on a continuum.  Though 
the adaptive self-regulation theory is superior to many theories in its ability to evaluate a 
dynamic process from multiple perspectives, it still holds as constants the many diverse always-
changing dynamic interactions.  A goal of future research is to find a method to evaluate the 
dynamics of societal change on the continuum in which it truly exists.  At the present, adaptive 
self-regulation is a good though imperfect tool for examining the complexities of the 
accountant’s work environment. 
One limitation common to all research, though generally only explicitly stated in critical 
research, is the combination of the perspectives and biases of the researcher, to the extent beyond 
which the researcher is unable to self-evaluate.  In relation to this study, the researcher believes 
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there is the underlying assumption that society is capable of advancing itself through human 
interaction.  From a more negative perspective, the researcher also believes that unconstrained 
human interaction carries the risk of causing damage to society.  As with any research, these 
beliefs are bound to color this researcher’s perspective.  The researcher invites the reader to both 
view this and all research through their own perspective and as many other perspectives as 
possible.  It is also the researcher’s belief that betterment of society29 will occur through a 
multitude of thoughts and views, as opposed to a narrow perspective.  It is this same belief that 
generates great anticipation of the possibilities for use of the multifaceted adaptive self-
regulation framework to aid in better understanding how the work lives of accountants affect the 
accounting profession and ultimately society in general. 
Although the currently investigated model and related works in progress mentioned 
throughout this dissertation focus on the antecedents of adaptive self-regulation and the 
mediating effect of perceptions of organizational politics, the next step is to determine how 
individuals resolve conflicting demands from various constituent groups.  In addition, group size 
is likely to factor into individuals’ perceptions of performance and leadership ability.  A need 
exists to find a way to account for this variable.  Another interesting future extension might be to 
measure perceptions of a leader’s performance and leadership by a panel and compare it to the 
leader’s own self-measurement.  In essence, this dissertation has revealed almost limitless 
opportunities for an interesting research agenda.  It has the potential to contribute significantly to 
various research areas as well as to the accounting profession and society. 
                                                 
29 The possibility of a “betterment of society” is a hotly debated and often contested belief.  The researcher sees no 
evidence that betterment is not possible.  The researcher believes both that there is a great advantage in believing 
that it is possible and that there is a great disadvantage to society in believing in the impossibility of bettering, or at 
least maintaining, the status quo. 
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Table 1 Demographics 
Variable/# Respondents Frequency        Average  Percentage  Range           
Age- (163)  39.32     21-67 
Gender- (168) Male   70     41.7  
 Female   98     58.3 
Status- (166) Married 104     62.7 
 Single   62     37.3 
Children- (165) None   91     55.2   
 One   28     17.0 
 Two   32     19.4 
 Three   12       7.3 
 Four     2       1.2 
Education- (164) College   74     45.1 
 Masters/+   90     54.9 
Experience in Years- (168)  16.06  0.08-37.00 
Years in Current Position- (167)     5.42  0.00-27.25 
Years in Public Accounting (PA)- (168)   5.66    70.2 0.00-33.50 
Currently- (162) Audit   28     17.3 
 Tax   38     23.5 
 Industry   36     22.2 
 Govern.   28     17.3 
 Other   32     19.8 
PA- (68)30 Partner     6       8.8 
 Manager   14     20.6 
 Senior   17     25.0 
 Staff   21     30.9 
 Other   10     14.7 
Not in PA- (107) Manager   47     43.9 
 Analyst   23     21.5 
 Staff   27     25.2 
 Other   10       9.2 
Certification -(99) CPA   85     80.6 
 CMA     4       3.8 
 CIA     3       2.7 
 Other   13     12.4 
Clarity of the Research Instrument- (165)   6.18    1-7 
Time to Complete in Minutes- (165) 27.58  15-50 
                                                 
30 Nine individuals answered both current position questions.  Without duplicates, those in public accounting consist 
of 5 Partners, 13 Managers, 13 Seniors, 21 Staff, and 7 Other.  Those in public accounting consist of 45 Managers, 
20 Analysts, 25 Staff, and 8 Others. 
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Table 2 Scales and item descriptive statistics of measures 
Scale Item     M   Std    α 
Performance    V1      .900 
PE105      5.16  1.293 
PE106      5.08  1.420 
PE107      4.59  1.660 
Leadership ability   V2      .928 
LA108      5.05  1.420 
LA109      5.44  1.379 
LA110      5.31  1.368 
LA111      5.22  1.601 
LA112      5.17  1.444 
LA113      5.30  1.417 
LA114      5.22  1.552 
Perception of organizational politics     .886 
General Political Behavior  V3      .836 
PPGB93     3.47  1.793 
PPGB96     4.05  1.915 
PPGB97     3.26  1.583 
PPGB100     4.14  1.962 
PPGB101     3.48  1.528 
PPGB102     3.54  1.790 
Going Along To Get Along V4      .824 
PPGA94     4.10  1.678 
PPGA95     3.36  1.533 
PPGA98     3.09  1.618 
PPGA99     3.18  1.638 
Pay and Promotion31        .585 
PPPP103*     3.35  1.473 
PPPP104*     3.79  1.717 
Self-monitoring         .893 
Ability    V5      .873   
SMA1      5.28  1.230 
SMA2      4.96  1.257 
SMA3      4.46  1.371 
SMA4      4.95  1.388 
SMA5      5.05  1.166 
SMA6      5.51  0.927 
 
                                                 
31 The variable "pay and promotion" did not meet the reliability criteria and was therefore excluded from the 
analysis.  Asterisks denote items deleted during Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
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Monitoring   V6      .868 
SMM7      4.65  1.213 
SMM8      5.05  1.151 
SMM9      5.04  1.162 
SMM10     5.21  1.087  
SMM11     5.27  0.968 
SMM12     4.53  1.175 
Power relationships        .852 
Expert     V7      .927 
PRE16      5.93  1.135 
PRE17      6.06  1.098 
PRE20      6.20  1.103 
PRE22      5.70  1.297 
PRE34      6.13  1.015 
Reward    V8      .890 
PRRD14     5.52  1.305 
PRRD24     5.56  1.239 
PRRD25     5.50  1.235 
PRRD28     5.45  1.358 
PRRD35     4.42  1.374 
Coercive    V9      .788 
PRC15      5.10  1.792 
PRC23*     5.17  1.685 
PRC29      5.01  1.690 
PRC33      4.92  1.627 
PRC36      4.74  1.751 
Referent   V10      .871 
PRRF13     5.25  1.273 
PRRF18     4.91  1.532 
PRRF21     5.82  1.330 
PRRF30     5.75  1.169 
PRRF37     5.86  1.147 
Legitimate   V11      .788 
PRL19      5.56  1.300 
PRL26*     4.66  1.634 
PRL27      5.93  1.030 
PRL31      5.74  1.190 
PRL32      5.73  1.206 
Trust          .920 
Honesty   V12      .808 
TRH68     4.96  1.539 
TRH69     5.35  1.555 
TRH70*     5.49  1.248 
TRH71*     6.07  0.936 
TRH72*     5.77  1.177 
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Benevolence   V13      .924 
TRB73     5.86  1.218 
TRB74     5.50  1.336 
TRB75     5.29  1.338 
TRB76     4.93  1.412 
TRB77     5.39  1.264 
Conflict orientation32
Collaboration   V14  5.76  2.221 
Competition   V15  4.59  2.770 
Compromise   V16  7.31  2.053 
Accommodation  V17  5.58  2.419 
Avoidance   V18  6.76  2.392 
Feedback         .831 
Feedback type            
Positive   V19      .758 
FBTP80     3.31  1.842 
FBTP81     3.30  1.736 
Negative   V20      .816 
FBTN78     3.55  1.723 
FBTN79     3.62  1.759 
Feedback strategy         
Inquiry   V21      .871 
FBSI82     2.60  1.642 
FBSI83     2.35  1.528 
FBSI84     2.20  1.316 
Direct Cue   V22      .814 
FBSD88     3.80  1.843 
FBSD89     3.98  1.801 
FBSD90     4.19  1.744 
Indirect Cue   V23      .715 
FBSI85     3.20  1.971 
FBSI86     3.16  1.742 
FBSI87*     2.68  1.778 
Hierarchical structure33        
Upward Information   V24  4.91  1.358 
Chain of Command  V25  3.08  1.679 
 
                                                 
32 Not a dichotomous, interval or ordinal scale - Alpha not calculated. 
33 Single indicators - Alpha not calculated.  
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Table 3 Bivariate correlations 
Relationship Between Variables or Constructs Pearson 
   Correlation34
H1: Self-Monitoring Perceptions of Org. Politics -0.098 
  PP-General -0.017 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.192* 
  
H2: Trust Relationship Perceptions of Org. Politics -0.512** 
  Leadership Ability  0.741** 
  Performance  0.686** 
 Trust-Honesty PP-General -0.319** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.373** 
  Leadership Ability  0.477** 
  Performance  0.503** 
 Trust-Benevolence PP-General -0.404** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.519** 
  Leadership Ability  0.757** 
  Performance  0.682** 
 
H3: Power Relationship Perceptions of Org. Politics -0.438** 
  Leadership Ability  0.710** 
  Performance  0.764** 
 Expert Power PP-General -0.225** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.278** 
  Leadership Ability  0.449** 
  Performance  0.616** 
 Reward Power PP-General -0.366** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.530** 
  Leadership Ability  0.715** 
  Performance  0.686** 
 Coercive Power PP-General -0.057 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.022 
  Leadership Ability  0.252** 
  Performance  0.218** 
 Referent Power PP-General -0.399** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.397** 
  Leadership Ability  0.686** 
  Performance  0.728** 
                                                 
34 Pearson correlation levels of significance * = .05, ** = .01. 
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 Legitimate Power PP-General -0.083 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.177* 
  Leadership Ability  0.137 
  Performance  0.174* 
 
H4a: Collaborating-CO Perceptions of Org. Politics PP -0.036 
  PP-General -0.020 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.050 
  Leadership Ability 
  Performance 
H4b: Avoiding-CO Perceptions of Org. Politics  0.045 
  PP-General  0.041 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  0.039 
  Leadership Ability 
  Performance 
H4c: Competing-CO Perceptions of Org. Politics -0.029 
  PP-General -0.001 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.062 
  Leadership Ability 
  Performance 
 
H5a: Self-Monitoring Collaborating-CO  0.175* 
H5b: Self-Monitoring  Compromising-CO -0.025 
 
H6: HighNeg/HighPosFB Perceptions of Org. Politics  -0.080 
  PP-General  0.027 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.219** 
 LowNeg/HighPosFB Perceptions of Org. Politics  0.328** 
  PP-General  0.296** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  0.283** 
 LowNeg/LowPosFB Perceptions of Org. Politics  0.080 
  PP-General -0.027 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  0.219** 
 
H7: Hierarchical Structure Perceptions of Org. Politics   0.019 
  PP-General  0.130 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.151* 
 Upward Information Perceptions of Org. Politics  -0.174* 
  PP-General -0.024 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along -0.350** 
 Chain of Command Perceptions of Org. Politics  0.166* 
  PP-General  0.199** 
  PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  0.071 
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H8: Perceptions of Org. Politics Leadership Ability -0.547** 
 PP-General  -0.397** 
 PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  -0.619** 
 
H9: Perceptions of Org. Politics Performance -0.504** 
 PP-General  -0.410** 
 PP-GoingAlong-to-Get Along  -0.503** 
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Table 4 Confirmatory factor analysis 
Construct Variable Factor Variance 
 No.  Items Retained Loadings Explained 
 
Endogenous 
Performance V1-Performance (3) .902-.924 84.03 
Leadership  V2-Leadership Ability (7) .797-.889 69.97 
Perceptions of Organizational Politics (10)  60.79 
 V3-General Political Behavior (6) .649-.837  
 V4-Going Along to Get Along (4) .727-.863 
  
Exogenous 
Self-Monitoring (12)  62.42 
 V5-Ability (6) .649-.836 
 V6-Sensitivity (6) .727-.863 
Power (23)   72.35 
 V7-Expert (5) .794-.932 
 V8-Reward (5) .706-.914 
 V9-Coercive (4) .720-.861 
V10-Referent (5) .719-.847 
 V11-Legitimate (4) .646-.877 
Trust (7)   76.77 
 V12-Honesty (2) .646-.938 
 V13-Benevolence (5) .771-.883 
Conflict-Orientation (30 items 2 choices) 
 V14-Collaborating (6) 
V15-Competing (6) 
 V16-Compromising (6) 
 V17-Accommodating (6) 
 V18-Avoiding (6)  
Feedback (12) 
 V19-Type –positive (2) .889-.905 83.43 
V20-Type - negative (2) .915-.922 
 V21-Strategy – inquiry (3) .862-.902 79.88 
V22-Strategy – direct cue (3) .617-.906 
V23-Strategy – indirect cue (2) .889-.904 
Hierarchical Structure (2) 
 V24-Upward Information (1)  
V25-Chain of Command (1) 
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Table 5 Hypothesized construct correlation matrix 
  
  PE LA PP SM PR TR CO Collab Compt     Compr Avoid FBtype HS
Performance 1.000             
Leadership             
           
             
             
            
             
        
   
             
0.807 1.000
Percep. Politics -0.504 -0.547 1.000           
Self-Monitoring 0.055 0.100 -0.098 1.000
Power Relationship 0.764 0.710 -0.438 0.159 1.000         
Trust Relationship 0.686 0.741 -0.512 0.103 0.663 1.000        
ConflictOrientation
 
0.088 0.144 -0.072 0.143 0.091 0.150 1.000 
Collaboration-CO
 
0.000 0.020 -0.036 0.175 0.054 0.119 0.487 1.000
Competitive-CO 0.053 0.108 -0.029 0.118 0.025 0.021 0.407 -0.029 1.000 
 Compromising-CO
 
0.045 0.091 -0.028 -0.025 0.059 0.022 0.062 -0.207 -0.122 1.000
Avoiding-CO -0.066 -0.144 0.045 -0.084 -0.084 -0.067 -0.689 -0.434 -0.447 -0.256 1.000
FB-type 0.125 0.154 -0.105 0.047 0.097 0.108 -0.013 -0.058 0.188 -0.121 0.066 1.000
Heirarical Structure 0.005 0.135 0.019 0.127 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.054 0.016 -0.020 -0.022 0.207 1.000
Correlations at or above 0.207 are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); correlations at 0.154 and above are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 6 Regressions on leadership ability 
                        Not-Mediated  Mediated  Change 
 Self-monitoring  -.020  -.028  -.008 
 Power relationship      .377   .347  -.030 
 Trust relationship   .488   .417  -.071 
 Avoiding-CO   -.103  -.098   .005 
 Compromising-CO    .023   .022   -.001 
 Competitive-CO    .035   .037   .002 
 Collaborative-CO  -.097  -.092   .005 
 Feedback-type     .042   .032  -.010 
 Hierarchy     .101   .111   .010 
 Percep.Politics     -.180 
 R2     .666    .689 
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Table 7 Regressions on performance 
               Not-Mediated  Mediated  Change 
 Self-monitoring  -.057  -.063  -.006 
 Power relationship      .554   .532  -.022 
 Trust relationship   .328   .275  -.053 
 Avoiding-CO   -.035  -.032   .003 
 Compromising-CO   -.014  -.015   -.001 
 Competitive-CO    .013   .014   .001 
 Collaborative-CO  -.073  -.069   .004 
 Feedback-type     .036   .029  -.007 
 Hierarchy    -.023  -.016   .007 
 Percep.Politics     -.133 
 R2     .652    .665 
 
  79
 Table 8 SEM fitted model correlation matrix 
V                          V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25
1 01. 0                         
2                        
                       
                      
                     
                    
                   
                  
                 
                
             
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
0.81 1.00 
3 -0.41 -0.40 1.00 
4 -0.50 -0.62 0.56 1.00 
5 0.06 0.08 -0.05 -0.16 1.00 
6 0.03 0.10 0.03 -0.18 0.51 1.00 
7 0.62 0.45 -0.22 -0.28 0.22 0.16 1.00 
8 0.69 0.71 -0.37 -0.53 0.11 0.19 0.41 1.00 
9 0.22 0.25 -0.06 -0.02 -0.19 -0.17 -0.06 0.17 1.00 
10 0.73 0.69 -0.40 -0.40 0.10 0.08 0.61 0.63 0.32 1.00 
11 0.17 0.14 -0.08 -0.18 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.25 -0.20 0.21 1.00   
12 0.50 0.47 -0.32 -0.37 -0.01 0.03 0.33 0.41 0.11 0.45 0.21 1.00
13 0.68 0.76 -0.40 -0.52 0.04 0.17 0.33 0.71 0.25 0.67 0.15 0.55 1.00
14 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.16 0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.12 1.00
15 0.05 0.11 0.00 -0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.11 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 1.00
16 0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.11 -0.01 -0.21 -0.12 1.00
17 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.10 -0.11 -0.22 -0.07 -0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.28 -0.57 -0.27 1.00
18 -0.07 -0.14 0.04 0.04 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.43 -0.45 -0.26 0.14 1.00
19 -0.18 -0.12 0.20 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.19 0.02 -0.12 -0.23 0.08 -0.29 -0.15 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 1.00
20 0.37 0.36 -0.20 -0.36 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.39 0.00 0.26 0.07 0.27 0.35 -0.01 0.24 -0.13 -0.14 -0.01 0.17 1.00
21 0.33 0.31 -0.20 -0.30 -0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.31 0.13 0.23 -0.11 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.24 0.52 1.00
22 0.21 0.29 -0.15 -0.27 0.18 0.17 0.26 0.27 -0.22 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.06 0.19 -0.06 -0.16 -0.07 0.22 0.40 0.22 1.00
23 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.18 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.11 -0.19 0.07 0.19 -0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.38 0.04 0.13 0.46 1.00
24 0.04 0.23 -0.02 -0.35 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.16 -0.11 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.22 0.21 1.00
25 -0.03 0.00 0.20 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.26
 
0.15
 
0.17
 
1.00
 Correlations above 0.198 are significant at the 0.1 level; correlations above 0.150 are significant at the .05 level.          
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Table 9 Fitted model estimated path coefficients 
Relationship  Standardized T-value35
From To  Path Coefficient 
 
Perception of Politics Performance -0.6275 9.87850* 
Perception of Politics  Leadership -0.7746 19.2195* 
GeneralPP Perception of Politics   0.4977  7.6957* 
Going AlongPP Perception of Politics   0.6888 10.1666* 
PR-Reward Perception of Politics  -0.5215  7.0946* 
PR-Referent Perception of Politics  -0.1396  1.2512 
TR-Honesty Perception of Politics  -0.1966  3.1783* 
CO-Collaborating Perception of Politics    0.1037  1.7929 
CO-Avoiding Perception of Politics    0.0648  1.1122 
FB-TypePositive Perception of Politics    0.1015  1.6596 
FB-Strategy Inquiry Perception of Politics  -0.1602  2.7812* 
FB-StrategyDirectCue Perception of Politics  -0.1077  1.9065 
 
 
                                                 
35 * Significant < .001 level 
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  SELF-REGULATION SYSTEM   
 
 
 
           Standard  
 
 
 Discrepancy detection 
             Setting 
 Behavior   
     
    
Discrepancy reduction 
Figure 1 Self-Regulation System 
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Figure 3 Potential Linkages Model 
  84
  
 
Figure 4 Summary of Structural Relationships 
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF ADAPTIVE SELF-REGULATION 
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Core Elements of the Self-Regulation Process 
 
The initial elements of the self-regulation process are the standards set by constituents.  
Examples of standards include formal control systems such as the Code of Conduct, GAAP, and 
firm policies; the demands of multiple constituents such as superiors, peers, clients, subordinates, 
and the public; as well as the needs and desires of the individual.  The individual compares his or 
her own behavior to these standards.  If a discrepancy is detected between his or her own 
behavior and the standards set by others, then the individual attempts to reduce the discrepancy 
in order to bring about a better fit between the standards and his or her behavior.  In the model 
tested in this study, effectiveness is defined to be the perceived performance or the perception of 
leadership ability of the individual. 
 
 
Standard Setting 
 
Standard setting includes specifying roles and the strategies to perform in those roles.  
Complications in standard setting can be either external or internal to the individual and can 
include; incomplete formal control systems, multiple constituent demands, conflicts between 
various standards, and individual agendas. 
The adaptive self-regulation model suggests that in the context of a social structure an 
individual must be able to reconcile his or her own self-interest with that of others.  Problems 
arise due to increased ambiguity and complexity when agendas and expectations conflict.  Many 
variables (the nature of the constituent’s expectations, the communication of these expectations, 
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the clarity of the individual’s own agenda, and the degree of demand across constituencies) may 
affect the standard-setting process (Tsui & Ashford, 1994; 98).  Individual standard setting is an 
adaptive, dynamic process involving the modification of initial standards, over time, using the 
discrepancy detection and reduction process described below. 
 
 
Discrepancy Detection 
 
In order to reduce discrepancies, discrepancy detection is the first step.  Individuals must 
be able to detect two types of discrepancies, those between their own and other’s standards as 
well as those relating to how they are perceived or evaluated.  In order to detect discrepancies an 
individual needs accurate information regarding the expectations of others.  In the majority of 
situations, the more an individual knows (providing the information is accurate), the more likely 
he or she will be able to take steps to reduce discrepancies. 
Multiple additional factors may also affect one’s ability to detect discrepancies.  Firstly, 
the accountant is required to maintain a ceaseless search for discrepancies as well as to 
accurately perceive the discrepancy once found.  Another factor important when attempting to 
detect discrepancies is the problem of mutually exclusive demands such as role conflict, trade-
offs and morale problems.  Feedback is also necessary to detect discrepancies; however, many 
individuals have mixed feelings about feedback.  They want it but fear the harm it may inflict on 
their self-esteem.  Another important variable that affects an individual’s success in detecting 
discrepancies is the ability to accurately determine the appropriate constituent set and to 
reconstruct the set as time and conditions change.  Finally, whether the individual seeking the 
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information is rational or not during the detection process affects both the detection of and 
potentially the reduction of the discrepancy.  Varieties of discrepancy reducing techniques, 
consisting of both rational and irrational behaviors, are further discussed below. 
 
 
Discrepancy Reduction 
 
Control theory and self-consistency theory, which serve as the basis for adaptive self-
regulation, portray discrepancy reduction as a straightforward process.  These theories state that 
the detection of a discrepancy motivates a person to alter his or her behavior to reduce the 
discrepancy (Carver & Scheier, 1985; Korman, 1976).  However, in context it is a far more 
complicated process.  An individual may, in addition to modifying his or her own behavior, 
attempt to modify others’ perception of the behavior or even others’ standards.  Generally, 
individuals respond in one of two ways to reduce discrepancies.  Ideally, an individual responds 
using effectiveness-oriented strategies, which are aimed at reducing conflict.  However, on 
occasion, an esteem-oriented response aimed at defending ego and self-esteem is enacted.  The 
prime determinate of an individual’s response to a perceived discrepancy is the individual’s self-
efficacy expectations regarding his or her ability to meet the standard (Tsui & Ashford, 1994; 
105).  Self-efficacy expectations are an individual’s beliefs about his or her abilities.  If the 
individual believes the probability of meeting a particular standard is low, the tendency is to use 
esteem-oriented strategies to reduce the discrepancy between standards.  Otherwise, 
effectiveness-oriented strategies are generally used to bridge the divide. 
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Effectiveness-oriented strategies are those that seek to actually reduce the gap between 
the standard and the behavior to attempt to more closely attain the standard.  In order to reduce 
this discrepancy an individual can react in one of following ways.  The individual may alter his 
or her own behavior to meet the expectations of others or influence others to change their 
expectations.  If the individual alters his or her own behavior too often, he or she runs the risk of 
being perceived as ineffective and weak.  The individual may choose to continue the behavior, 
but explain his or her behavior to others who perceive the behavior as inappropriate.  Again, the 
use of this strategy carries the risk of making the individual appear ineffective.  An additional 
effectiveness-oriented strategy sometimes used is to alter the set of constituents such that the 
behavior in question is acceptable to the new constituent group. 
Esteem-oriented strategies do not, nor are they intended to, decrease discrepancies.  
Therefore, perceived effectiveness is not actually impacted by esteem-oriented strategies.  In 
addition to the influence of self-efficacy, a second individual difference variable that may 
influence self-regulation is self-esteem since those with low self-esteem tend to avoid negative 
feedback (Miller, 1976).  Self-esteem is one’s feeling of self-worth and is not necessarily tied to 
one’s perception of ability, as was self-efficacy.  By avoiding negative feedback, individuals 
with low self-esteem will be less likely to detect discrepancies (Tsui & Ashford, 1994; 106).  
Even if feedback is not avoided, an individual may still distort the feedback so it conforms to the 
behavior at hand.  Other esteem-oriented strategies possibly used are either to lower one’s 
standards or to otherwise avoid or disengage.  Lowering one’s standards in this sense differs 
from reducing discrepancies discussed in the preceding paragraph because behavior has not 
actually changed, as is the case with effectiveness-oriented strategies. 
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APPENDIX B: INSTRUMENT 
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The measurement instrument for this study begins on the next page.  It is currently 
included in its entirety even though only certain aspects are applicable to the current study.  The 
publisher of the Thomas-Kilmann Mode instrument, Part III of this instrument, declined to allow 
its’ publication in any published document including the dissertation. 
The questions in the following measurement instrument originate from the scales 
discussed previously and listed below.  They are reproduced in their original form if possible and 
altered only if not doing so might lead to confusion for the participants.  A few questions or their 
scales have slight wording changes in order to tailor them to this study.  Those wording changes 
are minor and appear in blue lettering.  Standardization of the likert type scale to 7-points 
simplifies the instrument for the participants. 
Question Source      Measure 
1-8  Schyns & von Collani 2002    Self-efficacy 
9-18  Rosenberg 1965     Self-esteem 
19-30  Lennox & Wolfe 1984 (O’Cass 2000)  Self-monitoring 
31-55  Comer 1984 (Holzbach’s API)   Power 
Part III Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode 1994 (30) Conflict Orientation 
56-65   Kumar 1995 (deRuyter & Wetzels 1999)  Trust 
66-73  Rizzo, House, Litzman (RHL) 1970   Task Interdependence 
74-79  Rizzo, House, Litzman (RHL) 1970   Job Ambiguity 
80-92  Ashford & Tsui 1991    Feedback 
93-94  Rizzo, House, Litzman (RHL) 1970   Environment 
95-96  Rizzo, House, Litzman (RHL) 1970  Hierarchy 
97-98  Rizzo, House, Litzman (RHL) 1970   Communication  
99-110  Kacmar & Ferris 1991 (POPS Scale)  Percep/Politics  
111-126 Schriesheim 1979(Role Clarity & Consideration) Nature of the Norms 
127-129 Tsui 1984 (Reputational Effectiveness)  Performance  
130-136 Carless 2000      Leadership 
Remainder        Demographics 
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 A Study Investigating 
 
AUDITOR’S 
 
AND 
 
ACCOUNTANT’S 
 
WORKLIVES 
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Research Participants: 
 
Your assistance in studying the relationships of individuals in the accounting 
profession is requested and valued.  The entire questionnaire should require from 
20 to 30 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  The success of this study depends on 
it. 
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PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER THAT BEST CORRESPONDS TO YOUR JUDGMENT 
 
Part1:  Please answer the following questions about yourself 
 
1. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations in my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
2. If I am in trouble at work, I can usually think of something to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
3. I can remain calm when facing difficulties in my job because I can rely on my abilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True            Completely True 
 
4. When I am confronted with a problem in my job, I can usually find several solutions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
5.  No matter what comes my way in my job, I’m usually able to handle it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
6. My experiences have prepared me well for my occupational future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
7. I meet the goals I set for myself in my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
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8. I feel prepared to meet most of the demands of my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Not at all True                Completely True 
 
9. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
10. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
11. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
12. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
13. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
14. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
15. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
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16. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
17. I certainly feel useless at times. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
18. At times I think I am no good at all.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
 
19. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is 
called for. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
20. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impressions I 
wish to give them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
21. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it into 
something that does. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
22. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
23. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation in which 
I find myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
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24. Once I know what a situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
25. I am often able to read people’s true emotions correctly (through their eyes). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False               Always True 
 
 
26. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the 
person to whom I am conversing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False          Always True 
 
 
27. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding the emotions and 
motives of others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
28. I can usually tell when others consider a joke in bad taste, even though they may laugh 
convincingly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
29. I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener’s eyes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
 
 
30.  If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person’s manner of expression. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Always False                Always True 
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Part II: Please answer the following questions in reference to the individual you consider your 
immediate supervisor, boss, or superior at work. 
 
31. I admire him or her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
32. He or she gives credit where credit is due. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
33. He or she rules by might. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
34. He or she is skilled. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
35. He or she is knowledgeable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
36. I identify with him or her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
37. I have an obligation to accept his or her orders. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
 
38. He or she is experienced. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
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39. I respect him or her as a person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
40. He or she is proficient. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
41. He or she is retalitive. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
42. He or she recognizes achievement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
43. He or she is willing to promote others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
44. I am duty bound to obey him or her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
45. He or she has authority. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
46. He or she rewards good work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
  100
47. He or she is overly critical. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
48. He or she is friendly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
49. He or she is entitled to direct my actions on the job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
50. He or she is authorized to command. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
51. He or she is a disciplinarian. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
52. He or she is qualified. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
53. He or she offers inducement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
54. He or she is strict. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
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55. He or she is likeable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Extremely Inaccurate       Extremely Accurate 
 
Part III:  
The following questions are: “Modified and reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, CPP, Inc., 
Palo Alto, CA 94303 from Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument by Kenneth W. Thomas, 
Ralph H. Kilmann.  Copyright 2002 by Xicom, Incorporated.  Xicom, Incorporated is a subsidiary of 
CPP, Inc.  All rights reserved.  Further reproduction is prohibited without the Publisher’s written 
consent.” 
 
Following are several pairs of statements describing possible behavioral responses.  For each 
pair, select either statement "A" or statement "B", whichever is most characteristic of your 
own behavior. 
 
In many cases, neither statement may be very typical of your behavior; but please select the 
response that you would be more likely to use. 
 
The publisher of the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument  does not allow the instrument to 
be reproduced within published works such as dissertations.  For this reason, the thirty questions were 
deleted from the instrument as contained within this Appendix. 
 
 
  
This ends the specially reproduced statements from the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode 
Instrument. 
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PartIV: Please answer the following questions in reference to the individual you consider 
your immediate supervisor, boss, or superior at work. 
 
 
56. Even when my supervisor gives me a rather unlikely explanation, I am confident that he or 
she is telling the truth. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
57. My supervisor often provided information that has later proven to be inaccurate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
58. My supervisor usually keeps the promises he or she makes to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
59. Whenever my supervisor gives me advice on our business operations, I know that he or she is 
sharing his or her best judgment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
60. I can count on my supervisor to be sincere. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
61. Though circumstances change, I believe that my supervisor will be ready and willing to offer 
me assistance and support. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
62. When making important decisions, my supervisor is concerned about my welfare. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
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63. When I share my problems with my supervisor, I know that he or she will respond with 
understanding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
64. In the future, I can count on my supervisor to consider how his or her decisions and actions 
will affect me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
65. When it comes to things that are important to me, I can depend on my supervisor’s support. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
Part V: Please answer these questions about yourself at work. 
 
66. I have to do things that should be done differently. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
      
67. I receive an assignment without the manpower to complete it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
 
  
68. I have to buck a rule or policy in order to carry out an assignment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
 
 
69. I work with two or more groups who operate quite differently. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
  
70. I receive incompatible requests from two or more people. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
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71. I do things that are apt to be accepted by one person but not by another. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
 
72. I receive an assignment without adequate tools or resources to execute it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
 
73. I work on unnecessary things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
 
74. I feel certain about how much authority I have. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
 
75. There are clear, planned goals and objectives for my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
 
 
76. I know that I have divided my time properly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
 
 
77. I know what my responsibilities are. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True 
 
 
78. I know exactly what is expected of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False         Very True  
 
 
 
 
 
  105
79. Explanation is clear of what has to be done. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very False        Very True 
 
  
Part VI: Please answer the next set of questions thinking about the last six months.  How 
characteristic of it was it for your supervisor, boss, or superior to ………. 
 
80. Ask others to be critical when they gave him or her feedback. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
81. Prefer detailed, critical appraisals even though they might hurt 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
82. Tend to seek good news about himself or herself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
83. Ask for feedback if he or she knew it would be positive rather than negative. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
84. Directly ask for information concerning his or her performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
85. Directly ask you, ‘how am I doing?’ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
86. Directly ask for an informal appraisal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
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87. Observe how quickly you returned his or her phone calls. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often  
 
 
88. Observe how often you went to him or her for advice. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often 
 
 
89. Observe how long he/she was kept waiting when you and he/she had a set appointment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often 
 
 
90. Pay attention to how you acted toward him or her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often 
 
 
91. Pay attention to informal, unsolicited feedback. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often 
 
 
92. Pay attention to casual remarks you made. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Very Seldomly       Very Often 
 
 
 
Part VII: Please answer the following questions about your work environment. 
 
93. Selection for upward mobility is based on ability. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
94. There is much tolerance of error. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
  107
95. There is a high degree of upward information required at my place of work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
96. Violations in the chain of command dealt with harshly. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
97. There is adequacy of communication at my work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
98. There is information distortion and suppression at my place of work. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
Part VIII: Please answer the following questions thinking about the organization for which 
you currently work.      
99. Favoritism not merit get people ahead. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
   
100. It is no place for yes men. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
101. Individuals are encouraged to speak out. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
102. There is an influential group no one crosses. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
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 103. Individuals don’t speak for fear of retaliation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
104. Rewards come to hard workers.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
105. Promotions go to top performers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
106. Some build themselves up by tearing others down 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
107. Policy changes help only a few 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
108.  One group always gets their way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
109. Pay and promotion are consistent with policies. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
 
 
110. Pay and promotion policies are not politically applied. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree       Strongly Agree  
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Part IX: Please answer the following questions in reference to the individual you consider 
your immediate supervisor, boss, or superior at work. 
 
111. My supervisor gives me vague explanations of what is expected of me on my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
112. My supervisor gives me unclear goals to reach on my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
113. My supervisor explains the level of performance that is expected of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
114. My supervisor explains the quality of work that is expected of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
115. My supervisor explains what is expected of me on my job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
116. My supervisor helps make working on my job more pleasant. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
117. My supervisor says things to hurt my personal feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
 
 
118. My supervisor considers my personal feelings before acting. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False          Very True 
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119. My supervisor maintains a friendly working relationship with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True 
 
 
120. My supervisor behaves in a manner that is thoughtful of my personal needs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True 
 
 
121. My supervisor looks out for my personal welfare. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True 
 
 
122. My supervisor acts rudely toward me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True  
 
 
123. My supervisor does things to make my job less pleasant. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True 
 
 
124. My supervisor treats me without considering my feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True 
 
 
125. My supervisor shows respect for my personal feelings. 
 
Very False         Very True 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
126. My supervisor acts without considering my feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very False         Very True  
 
 
 
 
 
  111
127. Overall, to what extent do you feel your supervisor is performing his job the way you 
would like it to be performed? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not At All         Entirely  
 
  
128. To what extent has your supervisor met your expectations in his or her managerial roles 
and responsibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not At All         Entirely  
 
  
129.  If you entirely had your way, to what extent would you change the way your supervisor 
does his or her job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not At All         Entirely  
 
 
Part X: Please answer the following questions relative to your immediate supervisor, boss, 
or superior.  He or she…. 
 
130. ….. communicates clearly a positive vision of the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
  
131. ….. treats staff as individuals, supports and encourages their development. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
 
132. ….. gives encouragement and recognition to staff. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
 
 
133. ….. fosters trust, involvement, and cooperation among team members. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
 
134. ….. encourages thinking about problems in new ways and questions assumptions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
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135. ….. is clear about his/her values and practices what he/she preaches. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True  
 
 
136. ….. instills pride and respect in others and inspires me by being highly competent. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True 
  
Part XI: Information about Yourself 
1. Age:       ______________________________  
2. Gender:          _______ Male _______     Female 
3. Marital Status     _________Married ________Single 
4. How many Children at home   ______________________________ 
5. Educational Level Attained   ________College _______Masters/+ 
6. Years/months work experience:        ______  years ______       months 
7. Years/months in current position:        ______  years ______       months 
8. Total years/months experience in public accounting:____       years ______       months 
Current Position - Please Choose One: 
_______Auditing________Tax_________Industry________Government________Other 
Current Position - Please Choose One 
PublicAccounting:______Partner_______Manager_____Senior_______Staff ____Other 
All Other Forms:________Management_________Analyst_________Staff ______Other 
Certifications: ________CPA___________CMA ____________CIA ___________ Other 
9. How clear were the instructions on this survey? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Very False         Very True 
  
 
10. Approximately how much time did you spend on this survey?    _____Minutes               
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY. 
 
If you have any additional thoughts, please write them here: 
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APPENDIX D: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
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Informed Consent Form for: A Study Investigating Auditor’s and Accountant’s Work 
Lives 
You are being invited to participate in a research project conducted by Sharon K. Howell of the 
University of Central Florida’s Department of Accounting.  
You are invited to participate in a research study about the work lives of accountant’s and 
auditors.  
You will be asked to answer questions that will take about 20 to 30 minutes of your time.  
There are no known potential risks associated with this study. You may request the aggregated 
results of the study from the researcher for your own information at the completion of the study.   
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is 
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at 
any time with no penalty. You also have the right to refuse to answer any question(s) for any 
reason with no penalty.  
In addition, your individual privacy will be maintained in all publications or presentations 
resulting from this study. There will be no record maintained between an individuals name and 
the numbering system to insure confidentiality/anonymity.  
If you have any questions regarding this project, you may contact the researcher at (404) 823-
1478.  Questions or concerns about research participants’ rights may be directed to the UCFIRB 
office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research 
Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando, FL 32826.  The phone number is (407) 823-2901.  
I understand the above information and voluntarily consent to participate in the research.  
Signature of Participant_____________________________ Date ___________________  
Signature of Researcher ____________________________ Date ___________________  
 
____________ I would like to receive a copy of the procedure described above. 
____________ I would not like to receive a copy of the procedure described above. 
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